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ARTICLE
WHAT OWNERS WANT AND GOVERNMENTS DO:
EVIDENCE FROM THE OREGON EXPERIMENT
Bethany R. Berger*
In 2004, Oregonians decisively approved Ballot Measure 37. The
measure answered the calls of critics of contemporary takings
jurisprudence by requiring either compensation for losses caused by land
use restrictions imposed after acquisition of the property or waivers of the
restrictions. Three years later, voters acted to repeal most of Measure 37
by an even greater margin. Together the birth, brieflife, and rapid demise
of Measure 37 comprise an unusual natural experiment in property law.
The results of this experiment go to the heart of debates about regulatory
takings in property law and policy.
First, the Oregon experience resulted in a sea change in owners'
understandings of property rights. The 2004 vote reflected the popular
understanding of land use restrictions as invasions of property rights.
Facedwith effective repeal of those restrictions, as reflected in passionate
testimony before the Oregon legislature, Oregonians came to see the
regulations as in fact the source of the property rights upon which they
depended. In effect Measure 37 brought the backgroundgovernment and
community support on which property rights depend into the foreground of
owners' consciousness. Second, government responses to Measure 37
challenged arguments that compensation will dispel the fiscal illusion
under which governments operate and result in more efficient regulation.
Rather than weigh costs and benefits, in all but one of thousands of cases,
state and local governments waived regulatory restrictions rather than
compensate. These decisions were made without analysis of the benefits of
the regulations waived, and despite predictably negative economic results.
Finally, the thousands of claims and research catalyzed by these claims
complicated questions of the compensation to which owners are entitled as
a matter of fairness. In many cases, owners demanded compensation
although their properties had already multiplied many times in value
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Sincere thanks for helpful
comments and suggestions to Hillary Greene, George Lefcoe, Jeremy Paul, Peter Siegelman,
and Joseph William Singer. Thanks also to the University of Connecticut Law School
Foundation for generous summer support for research on this project.
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despite the challenged restrictions,and their claims of loss elided the effect
of the restrictions themselves in generating the value they claimed they
could reap if the restrictionswere lifted.
While limited, therefore, the Oregon experiment sheds the light of lived
experience on abstract debates about takings law. Together, its results
challenge common understandings of the role rights, efficiency, and
fairness concerns play in arguments about compensation for land use
restrictions, and provide provocative evidence that they weigh against
compensation in many cases.
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INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2004, Oregon voters passed ballot initiative Measure 37
by sixty-one percent to thirty-nine percent. 1 Hailed as yet another opening
shot in the property rights revolution, 2 the measure answered the calls of
critics of contemporary takings jurisprudence by requiring compensation
for losses caused by most regulatory restrictions imposed after the
acquisition of the property. 3 If the municipality chose not to compensate
the owner, the regulation would be waived. 4 Three years later, voters
enacted Measure 49, intended to repeal most of Measure 37, by an even
greater margin, sixty-two percent to thirty-eight percent. 5 Together the
birth, brief life, and rapid demise of Measure 37 comprise an unusual
natural experiment in property law. This Article uses the results of this
experiment to shed light on contemporary debates about property regulation
and takings law.
The Oregon experiment complicates arguments about regulatory
restrictions in three ways. First, it challenges understandings of what
property rights are and how they relate to governmental regulation. The
intuitive understanding of property is that it comprises a sphere of
"exclusive dominion," in William Blackstone's much abused phrase, 6
within which the government appropriately protects the owner from
involuntary invasion but most governmental restrictions on use are unfair
violations of a social compact. This understanding of property won the day
in the passage of Measure 37, as citizens voted to fight back against the
unfairness ostensibly caused by Oregon's comprehensive land use
regulation. Over the three years in which Oregonians were faced with
effective repeals of property regulation on neighboring parcels, these
perceptions changed. Homeowners discovered that their property values
would be undermined and their infrastructure overwhelmed by the
emergence of subdivisions without sufficient water and sewage systems to
support them. 7 Farmers realized that their ability to continue farming
would be threatened by the appearance of residences that would spray

1. General
Election
Abstract
of
Votes,
State
Measure
37,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.doc (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
2. See Gregory Roberts, Oregon Could Foretell Our Land-Use Destiny: Sprawl,
Chaos, Justice? Clues Lay in '04 Property-Rights Win, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov.

1, 2006, at Al.
3. See Ballot Measure 37, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005), amended by OR. REV.
STAT. § 195.305 (2007).

4. Id.
5. See Elections Division, Oregon Secretary of State, Special Election Abstract of
Votes, State Measure No. 49, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007/abstract/
results.doc (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
6. See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE
L.J. 601 (1998) (discussing ways that focus on William Blackstone's assertion of "exclusive
dominion" distorts both Blackstone and property law).
7. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
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harmful herbicides and challenge the odors and noise caused by farming. 8
All found that what they had come to accept as part of "their" property-the
pastoral view, the pristine river, or the agricultural community-depended
on the comprehensive zoning they had previously understood to be unfair. 9
Although Measure 49 repealed less of Measure 37 than Oregonians perhaps
believed, in 2007 they decisively voted to reject its concept of property
rights.
Second, the Oregon experiment challenges assertions about how
compensation requirements will affect governmental action. One important
set of arguments for broader compensation concerns the hypothesized effect
of such compensation on governments. If governments are forced to pay
for the impact of property regulation, the argument goes, they will
internalize the costs of such regulation, and only go forward with
regulations that are economically efficient in that their benefits outweigh
their costs. 10 While others have challenged the theoretical validity of such
arguments,II Measure 37 provides evidence to back these challenges. In
only one claim, out of the over 7000 Measure 37 claims filed, did the state
or municipality choose to compensate the property owners rather than
waive the regulation. 12 In every other resolved case, the state and
municipal governments that received the claims did not internalize the cost
or pass the burden on to the taxpayers-they simply waived the regulations.
They did so despite substantial evidence that the costs of the piecemeal
waivers would outweigh their benefits: they would seriously undermine
Oregon's multibillion dollar agricultural industry, threaten safety and
significantly increase burdens on local governments by overwhelming
water and sewage systems, and reduce the value of countless owners who
had purchased their homes after the regulations went into effect. Although
this does not prove what governments would do under a property regime
which had compensation requirements that were known at the moment the
regulations were enacted, rather than retroactively created, it at least
provides provocative evidence against cost-internalization arguments.
Finally, and related to the first two points, the Oregon experiment
complicated arguments that compensation was necessary as a matter of
fairness and distributive justice by challenging notions of what owners in
8. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 200-06.
10. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 186-87 (5th ed.
2009).
11. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST.

COMMENT. 279 (1992) (arguing that public choice theory questions the cost-internalization
theory); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509

(1986) (arguing that compensation inefficiently interferes with assessments of market risks
and benefits); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (2000) (arguing that governments

are not subject to the same motivations as firms and do not experience costs and benefits of
regulations in ways that would lead to their internalization of such costs).
12. See Prineville Writes FirstMeasure 37 Check (OPB radio broadcast Sept. 12, 2007),
available at http://news.opb.org/article/340-prineville-writes-first-measure-37-check/.
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fact lost. Losses caused by land use restrictions are usually understood, and
were typically asserted by Measure 37 claimants, as the difference between
the current value of land and the value if restrictions were removed for that
individual parcel. Economically, this compensation calculus ignores the
ways restrictions on neighboring parcels enhance the value of the owner's
parcel, by tightening the market for development property, coordinating
land uses, and preserving the existing community. There is some evidence
in the Oregon case that these regulations actually caused the value of
property to increase at an equal or greater rate than it would have if not
subject to restrictions. A comprehensive study of changes in land values in
three Oregon counties catalyzed by Measure 37 showed that restricted
rate than those in
Oregon parcels generally increased in value at a greater
13
comparable unrestricted areas of Washington State.
This measure of compensation also rejects other measures that-while
not fully accounting for economic opportunity costs caused by the
regulation-might better reflect what society would recognize as a just
claim on the state. In particular, it does not consider whether the owner has
accrued an otherwise just return on her investment, although this is an
important factor in constitutional takings analysis. Although one might
justifiably (albeit, sadly, not securely) expect the value of one's property to
increase over time, does justice demand that owners receive exponentially
greater returns than they would on other investments? The above study
showed that Oregon property multiplied in value even with the restrictions
in place. Similarly, the most visible Measure 37 claim was made for a
parcel whose value was more than 150 times what it had been when the
owner had purchased it. 14 The claim was based on the owner's assertion
that without restrictions, the property was worth 511 times her initial
investment. 15 While there are surely some who would agree that justice
would entitle an owner to this entire sum, many might perceive it as a
windfall not giving rise to a justice-based claim against the state.
The remainder of the Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the
history of the Oregon experiment and its relation to theories of when the
government should compensate owners for property restrictions. Part II
discusses the ways the experiment reflected and shifted public views of the
13. See WILLIAM K. JAEGER & ANDREw J. PLANTINGA, How HAVE LAND-USE
REGULATIONS AFFECTED PROPERTY VALUES IN OREGON?, SPECIAL REPORT 1077, at 22, 26

(2007) (showing that land values in two Western Oregon counties grew more than those in
comparable Washington counties, while values of agricultural parcels in one Western
Oregon county grew less, although the median growth rate was equal).
14. This example is based on the claims of campaign spokesperson Dorothy English.
Mrs. English purchased thirty-nine acres with her husband in 1953 for $4500. Laura
Oppenheimer, Breaking Ground: Land Owners Who Foughtfor Measure 37 Ready the First
Cases, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at Al. In the 1970s, they sold twenty acres for $53,400,
so that their investment in the remaining land was reduced to $2250. In 2004, when Mrs.
English brought her claim, the land with the restrictions in place was worth $339,000, or
150.66 times $2250. Id. Without the restrictions, Mrs. English claimed, the land was worth
$1.15 million, or 511.11 times $2250. Id.
15. Id.
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relationship between property rights and governmental regulation. Part III
discusses governmental implementation of Measure 37, explaining why the
choice to waive the vast majority of regulations and the single case of
compensation were predictable given what we know about political
decision making. Part IV discusses the ways Measure 37 revealed the
indeterminacy of measures of loss and compensation for land use
restrictions, and how this impacts claims to compensation as a matter of
fairness and justice.
Part V discusses what the Oregon experiment means for debates on
constitutional takings law and state legislative and constitutional measures
that seek to raise the federal constitutional floor. Takings law is a
complicated mix of theories about fairness, efficiency, governmental
competence, individual rights, community rights, and the nature of property
itself. The impossibility of reaching a final agreement on any one of these,
let alone all in interaction, is why the area is and will remain a subject of
vehement popular and legal debate. The brief experience under Measure 37
sheds the light of lived experience on this debate. While clearly not the
final word on any of these subjects, it provides valuable evidence for the
continuing electoral and judicial struggles with these issues.
I. THE BIRTH, LIFE, AND DEATH OF MEASURE

37

"If the majority wants to save this stuff, then the majority should pay for
So Dorothy English, the "poster grandma" of Measure 37,17
described the regulations that prevented subdivision of her forestland
property. In television and radio ads that blanketed Oregon in the weeks
before the 2004 election, English told voters how Oregon's 1973 land use
laws had prevented her from subdividing the forty acres she had purchased
with her husband twenty years before their enactment. "I'm 91 years old,
my husband is dead and I don't know how much longer I can fight,"' 8 she
said in a voice
alternatively described as "gravelly,"' 19 "pleading," 20 and
"quavering." 2 1 "My story is a simple story, but it's been going on for so
long." 22 Although Measure 37's opponents outspent proponents by three to
one, 23 on November 2, 2004, sixty-one percent of voters voted to enact it. 24
it."'1 6

16. Id.
17. Richard Roesler, Voters Consider Property Measures:

Washington, Idaho

Initiatives Modeled After Oregon Law, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Oct. 8, 2006,

at Al.
18. Id.
19. Editorial, Do Us All a Favor, OREGONIAN, Jan. 29, 2005, at D4.
20. Laura Oppenheimer, Lines Drawn on Land Use Put Victory Within Reach,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 7, 2004, at Al.

21. Roesler, supra note 17.
22. Oppenheimer, supra note 20.
23. Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Election: Emotions Will Flow in Battle over a
Rewrite, OREGONIAN, May 5, 2007, at B 1.
24. General
Election
Abstract
of
Votes,
State
Measure
37,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.doc (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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Measure 37 provided that when land use regulations enacted after
purchase of the land reduced its value, the government had to either
compensate the owner or waive enforcement. 25 Although English's
personal story provided the emotional center of the campaign, the
campaign's broader message resonated with voters' instincts about property
rights and governmental fairness. Nor was it the first such time Oregonians
had approved such a measure. In 2000, fifty-four percent had voted to
enact a similar rule as a constitutional amendment, 2 6 but the Oregon
Supreme Court later invalidated the amendment for affecting more than one
constitutional provision in a single referendum in violation of the Oregon
27
Constitution.
Oregonians in Action, the property rights group that spearheaded the
campaign for Measure 37, claimed that the measure simply closed a "legal
loophole." 28
In fact, it fundamentally reworked governmental
compensation requirements. While permanent involuntary invasions of
land almost always require compensation under the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, 29 courts have rarely found the same for regulatory
30
restrictions. It was not until 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
that the U.S. Supreme Court held that regulations could ever constitute a
taking. 3 1 Mahon, moreover, was quickly followed by decisions continuing
32
the traditional refusal to require compensation for use restrictions.
Although the Court in 1992 suggested that one other use restriction was a
compensable taking-a coastal building restriction that was stipulated to
deprive the property of all economic value 33-it
is only a slight
exaggeration to say that under current Supreme Court precedent, the
34
"bottom line is that the complaining property owner almost always loses."
25. Ballot Measure 37, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005), amended by OR. REV. STAT. §

195.305 (2007).
26. Michael C. Blumm & Erik Grafe, Enacting Libertarian Property:
Measure 37 andIts Implications, 85 DENy. U. L. REV. 279, 300-02 (2007).

Oregon's

27. League of Or. Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892 (Or. 2002).
28. Measure 37: Restoring Balance and Fairness in Oregon's Land Use Laws,
http://measure37.com/why.htm (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
29. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., 458 U.S. 419,441 (1982).
30. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
31. Id. at415.
32. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding that a requirement that
property owner destroy a large number of ornamental red cedar trees on property was not a
compensable taking); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding that
a zoning law that caused a seventy-five percent reduction in the market value of land did not
constitute a compensable taking); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922) (holding
that a requirement that property owner remove structure on land deemed unsafe for party
wall built by neighbor without compensation did not violate Constitution).
33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Court did not rule that
the measure was necessarily a taking, but held that such economic wipeouts were per se
compensable unless the regulations merely implemented "background principles of nuisance
and property law," and remanded to the South Carolina courts for a determination of whether
the measure satisfied this standard. Id. at 1031-32.
34. William A. Fischel, Why Are Judges So Wary of Regulatory Takings?, in PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 50, 55 (Harvey M. Jacobs ed., 2004). Plaintiffs have found
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This relative uniformity in Supreme Court results conceals significant
scholarly debate, political outrage, and state legislative activity. A number
of respected scholars, not all from the conservative side of the political
35
spectrum, have suggested a broader scope for regulatory takings.
Resistance to environmental restrictions gave rise in the 1980s to a political
phenomenon, the "property rights movement," that has succeeded in
changing the discourse regarding land use regulation. 36 More important,
the movement has resonated with voters and legislatures, resulting in the
introduction of laws restricting governmental powers of eminent domain
and regulation in all fifty states, and passage of such laws in twenty-seven
states before 2004. 37 While not directly relevant to regulatory restrictions,
the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City ofNew London 38 holding
that property could be condemned for economic development purposes
mobilized thirty-seven states to enact legislation or constitutional
amendments seeking to restrict the purposes for which land could be
39
condemned.
This state-level activity found a particularly tempting target in Oregon,
which has one of the most comprehensive and coordinated land use regimes
in the country. Beginning with the enactment of Senate Bill 100 in 1973,40
the state created a series of land use goals, and required municipalities to

somewhat more success in lower courts, a phenomenon commentators have particularly
noted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, both Article I courts where the executive has control over judicial appointments. See
David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit,29 ENVTL. L. 821, 828-31 (1999).
35. The foundational conservative scholarly call is articulated in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS], which argues that compensation must, as a matter of the basic social

compact, be paid for all governmental restrictions of property rights (broadly defined) that
would not be permitted by private parties under the common law. Id at 36. (For Epstein's
slightly more nuanced current position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: How

To

PROPERTY (2008) [hereinafter
Works by moderate to progressive scholars suggesting some
expansion of compensation for regulations include Frank Michelman's bible of takings
theory, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (suggesting that compensation should
be provided where transaction costs are low and the risks of demoralization or unfair
imposition on the powerless are high) and Michael Heller and James Krier's Deterrence and
Distributionin the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1009-11 (1999) (suggesting that
compensation should be provided in cases such as Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915), even where regulation prevents nuisance-like harm if the burden on the individual
property owner is high).
36. Harvey M. Jacobs, Introduction: Is All That Is Solid Melting into Air?, in PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 34, at 1.
37. Id. at 2.
38. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
39. Edward J. L6pez, R. Todd Jewell & Noel Campbell, Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast!:
State Legislative Response to the Kelo Backlash, REV. L. & ECON., available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle= I268&context=rle.
40. S.B. 100, 57th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1973), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/bills/sb100.pdf.
REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT].)

PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE
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create plans to implement these goals. 4 1 The most important results of the
goals are as follows: most residential development is permitted only within
"urban growth boundaries," defined as the municipal areas and the areas
around them determined necessary to satisfy increased residential needs
over the next twenty years; 42 most nonfarm uses and virtually all
subdivisions are prohibited on lands designated agricultural; 4 3 and similar
restrictions exist on lands designated forest or timberlands. 44
To
compensate for their lesser investment value, forest and agricultural lands
are subject to greatly reduced tax assessments. 4 5 With most private land in
Oregon designated as exclusive agricultural or forestland, Oregon has
largely avoided sprawl, remaining a place of scenic farms, forests, and
46
coastlands dotted with relatively dense, walkable cities.
Oregonians love and value their farmlands, forests, and open spaces.
These are part of the "Oregon identity-and ethic," the "Oregon mystique"
47
that distinguishes the state from California, the big neighbor to the south.
They even rejected three separate ballot initiatives that would have repealed
the land use regulations that protected them. 4 8 But these regulations still
clashed with two deeply held understandings of property in land. First, to
use Joseph Singer's phrase, they violated the idea of property as "castle"-a
sphere of personal autonomy and dominion and a bulwark against
governmental abuse and domination. 49 Second, they violated what Joseph
Sax calls the "transformative economy" model of property, 50 in which
development and transformation of land is understood to maximize utility
not only for the owner but for society as a whole.
Within this scheme, it is easy to understand why the argument for
compensation for regulatory takings has intuitive appeal. First, proponents
might assert, preventing the individual from using her property as she

41. For more comprehensive discussions of this scheme and its history, see PLANNING
THE OREGON WAY: A TwENTY YEAR EVALUATION xi-xxii (Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe &
Sy Adler eds., 1994) and Blumm & Grafe, supra note 26, at 285-304. The majority of
Oregon's land use planning scheme is codified at Oregon Revised Statutes chapter 197.
42. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(2) (2007) (defining urban growth boundary and
zoning considerations within urban growth boundaries).
43. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203, .283, .284 (2007). Restrictions on new residential
dwellings are slightly relaxed for lands not designated "high value" agricultural lands, but
the restrictions remain extremely strict. Id. §§ 215.700, .705, .7 10.
44. Id. §§ 215.720-755 (restricting new residential dwellings on forestland).
45. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308A.50-.128 (2007) (farmland taxation); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 321.259-.290 (2007) (forestland taxation).
46. Arthur C. Nelson, Oregon's Urban Growth Boundary Policy as a Landmark
PlanningTool, in PLANNING THE OREGON WAY, supra note 41, at 25, 33.
47. William G. Robbins, The Place We Call Home: A History of Land-Use Planningin
Oregon, OR. HUMAN., Spring 2006, at 14, 14 (quoting former Oregon Governor Tom McCall
and former Washington Governor John Kitzhaber) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Blumm & Grafe, supra note 26, at 279.
49. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1451 (1993).
50. Id. at 1442.
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51
wishes takes property rights by undermining autonomy in the castle.
Relatedly, the individual loses her protection from governmental
domination, as corrupt governmental officials or self-serving majorities
may press property into service for their own ends. Second, governmental
restrictions on use of property may be seen as undermining the wealth of
society by preventing individuals from entering into voluntary
arrangements to use their property in the most efficient and productive
manner. Compensation for regulatory restrictions, according to the classic
argument, solves both problems. It restores fairness and checks domination
by selfish majorities by making the taxpayers pay for deprivations of
property rights. Next, it encourages efficient regulation by making the
government internalize the costs of its restrictions on property, so that it
will choose to go forward only with efficient regulations, those that produce
benefits above the reductions in property value they cause.
After a few years of experience under the Oregon experiment, however,
the appeal of this scheme began to fade. Contrary to the cost-internalization
theory, governments faced with compensation requirements did not choose
between efficient and inefficient regulations-in all but one case, they
simply waived all land use restrictions on qualifying Measure 37
claimants, 52 despite substantial evidence that these waivers would have a
devastating economic effect on agriculture, municipalities, and surrounding
housing values.
Nor were the claims for what the campaign had led voters to envision:
claims by families to build a few homes for themselves and their relatives
on their land. Most of the claims, and the vast majority of the acreage
covered, were for multi-unit subdivisions rather than the one to three homes
that voters had expected. 53 Although only one percent of the claims were
for nonresidential purposes, these claims-for mining, vast resorts, and
megamalls-were among the most controversial. Oregonians were not
happy. By October 2006, a poll found that if permitted to vote again on
Measure 37, forty-eight percent would vote no and twenty-nine percent

51, This gendered language carries a substantive point: takings test cases frequently
involve female plaintiffs, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S.
419 (1982), perhaps because they are more sympathetic as representatives of the "home" that
needs to be protected from imposition. Dave Hunnicutt, executive director of Oregonians in
Action, which both spearheaded the Measure 37 campaign and represented Mrs. Florence
Dolan in her successful battle against Tigard, was kidded about the effectiveness of
"Hunnicutt's widows." Laura Oppenheimer, The Monday Profile: The Man Behind Measure
37: David Hunnicutt: Populist Lawyer Reigns in Aftermath of Land Use Reversal,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 20, 2004, at Al.
52. See Prineville Writes FirstMeasure 37 Check, supra note 12.

53. Although 42% of claims were for one to three homesites, 58% were for subdivisions
of at least four homes. See HENRY R. RICHMOND & TIMOTHY G. HOUCHEN, AM. LAND INST.,

MEASURE 37: IS IT DOING WHAT OREGON VOTERS WANTED?, at 8 tbl.2 (2007). Subdivision
claims encompassed 73.1% of all acreage affected. Id. Claims for more than ten homes
covered 71% of the total acreage affected. VICTOR ATIYEH, BARBARA ROBERTS & JOHN D.
GRAY, MEASURE 37 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007) [hereinafter ATIYEH REPORT].
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would vote yes; of respondents who said they had heard a lot about the
measure, sixty-six percent would vote no to only twenty-six percent who
would vote yes. 54 In many cases, this appeared to reflect the changed
opinions of those who had initially voted for the measure.
In January 2007, the Joint Committee on Land Use Fairness began
hearings on the Governor's proposal to delay processing of Measure 37
claims while the impact of the law could be studied. 55 Within a few weeks,
the committee decided permanent legislation needed to be considered. On
February 14, 2007, committee member Senator Kurt Schrader introduced
Senate Bill 588, providing that owners of land subject to regulations that
prevented them from building a home and which had lost at least twenty
percent of its value as a result would be permitted to build a single dwelling
or receive compensation. 5 6 Over the next two months, negotiations in the
legislature produced the far more complex House Bill 3540. 57 On April 17,
a single hearing was held on the new bill. 58 On June 15, the legislature, in a
59
largely party-line vote, agreed to send Measure 49 to the voters.
Both opponents and proponents described the measure as significantly
amending Measure 37. Opponents claimed that it repealed the voters' will,
while proponents claimed it limited claimants to a handful of houses. This
is the description of Measure 49 distributed by the Yes on 49 campaign:
Ballot Measure 49 protects the property rights of small individual
landowners by immediately allowing them up to 3 houses on their
property, if the law allowed it when they bought their land....
Additionally, property owners can build up to 10 houses if they can
document a financial loss equal to the value of the additional houses-as
voters intended with passing 37.
If property is high-value farmland, forests or places with limited water
supplies-as defined in the act, then only up to 3 homesites may be
added.
Ballot Measure 49 closes the loopholes and protects the places that make
Oregon special, stopping the abuse of huge housing subdivisions, strip
malls and industrial development where they simply don't belong.
54. BEN TULCHIN & LUNNA LOPES, GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, OREGON
STATEWIDE POLL RESULTS: OREGONIANS HAVE BUYER'S REMORSE FOR MEASURE 37 (2006),
availableat www.defendersactionfund.org/newsroom/oregonpoll.pdf.
55. See Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongoski, Governor Urges Legislature To Put
Small Landowners at Front of the Line (Jan.
19, 2007), available at
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/P2007/press_01 1907.shtml (regarding proposal to fast track
small claims and provide 180-day moratorium for others); Peter Wong, Measure 37's
Aftershocks Felt Two Years Later, STATESMAN-JOURNAL (Salem, Or.), Feb. 5, 2007, at IA

(describing beginning of hearings in response to governor's proposal).
56. S.B. 588, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
57. Or. Bill Hist., 2007 Reg. Sess., H.B. 3540 (2007), http://www.leg.state.or.us/

07reg/pubs/hsemh.html (reflecting introduction of bill on April 12, 2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Following passage of Measure 49, commercial and industrial
development, as well as large subdivisions, must proceed
through the
60
existing land use planning and development processes.
Similarly, the ballot language drafted by the legislature declared that a
"'Yes' vote modifies Measure 37; clarifies private landowners' rights to
build homes; extends rights to surviving spouses; limits large
developments; protects farmlands, forestlands, groundwater supplies,"
while a "'No' vote leaves Measure 37 unchanged; allows claims to develop
large subdivisions, commercial, industrial projects on lands now reserved
61
for residential, farm and forest uses."
The No on 49 website created by Oregonians in Action described the
measure in these terms:
MEASURE 49 IS A DIRECT ATTEMPT TO REPEAL MEASURE 37

If approved, Measure 49 will wipe out almost all current Measure 37
claims, and will eliminate all protection from future regulations. In short,
if Measure 49 is approved, Oregon will return to the days before 2004,
when state and local governments imposed land use regulations without
regard to the impacts that those regulations had on the property owners
being regulated....
Measure 49 makes the following drastic changes to current law:
1. Nearly every Measure 37 claimant will have their claim wiped out,
even if the claim has already been approved....
2. All protection from future land use regulations will be eliminated....
Measure 37 protects every Oregon property owner by insuring that the
rights that an owner has to use their land when it is purchased are
protected in the future. Measure 37 guarantees that when you buy a home
or property, the state and local governments cannot pass new land use
regulations that take away your rights without compensating you for the
loss, unless the new regulations are needed to protect the public's health
and safety. If approved, Measure 49 will wipe out those protections, and
return us to the days when government would steal your property without
62
compensation.
The Yes on 49 factsheet was relatively accurate about the impact of
Measure 49 on existing Measure 37 claims, those seeking compensation
due to regulations enacted before its passage. Measure 49 eliminates the
60. Ballot Measure 49: How It Works, www.yeson49.com (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) [hereinafter Ballot Measure 49 Website].
61. H.B. 2640, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). Oregonians in Action
unsuccessfully challenged this language and the accompanying explanatory statement as
biased and misleading. Grudzinski v. Bradbury, Civ. No. 07-6195-AA, 2007 WL 2733826
(D. Or. Sept. 12, 2007).
62. See Vote No on Measure 49, http://www.measure37.com (on file with author).
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possibility of relief for those prevented from putting their land to industrial
or commercial uses. 63 It also substantially changes the extent of relief
available to claimants who had already filed under Measure 37, Such
claimants may receive "fast track" approval to build up to three houses on
their land if they could have done so when they purchased the land. 64 This
provision expands prior legislative amendments that permitted owners to
build up to one home on their land. 65 Owners may also build up to ten
homes on their property, but only if they show that the parcel is not "high
value" agricultural or timberland, provide appraisals proving that the land
actually went down in value after passage of the challenged restriction, and
establish that the number of homes requested is necessary to compensate for
the loss shown by the appraisals. 66 The one exception to these limits is that
those who can prove they had gained a common law "vested rest" to use the
land as they would have with the Measure 37 waiver by substantially
67
investing in reliance on the waiver may go forward with their plans.
Although none of the campaign literature accurately described this,
Measure 49 preserves much of Measure 37 for regulations enacted after its
passage. The No on 49 campaign asserted that under Measure 49 "all
protection from future land use regulations will be eliminated," while Yes
on 49 claimed that "[f]ollowing passage of Measure 49, commercial and
industrial development, as well as large subdivisions, must proceed through
the existing land use planning and development processes. '68 While it is
true that Measure 49 eliminated claims arising from future commercial or
industrial restrictions, 69 owners may demand compensation or waiver for
70
new regulations affecting residential, timber, or farming practices.
Measure 49 does enact some important limitations on claimants, requiring
appraisals proving that the value of the property went down after the
regulation was enacted, that the desired use of the property is its "highest
and best use," and that any waiver of the restriction be no more than is
necessary to compensate for the loss the restrictions caused. 7 1 Although
these restrictions will prevent some of the massive compensation demands
made by Measure 37 claimants, they do not necessarily prevent building
large subdivisions on a parcel as the Yes on 49 factsheet would suggest.
Some commentators have argued that the compensation requirement will
have a significant chilling effect on governments in modifying their land
use regulations, 72 while others have argued that as a result, Measure 49
63. See OR. REv. STAT. § 195.300(14) (2007) (describing land use regulation to include

only regulations affecting residential, farm, or timber uses).
64. Ballot Measure 49, ch. 424, §§ 5, 6, 8, 2007 Or. Laws 1138, 1142-45.
65. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.700, .705, .710 (2007).
66. Ballot Measure 49, ch. 424, §§ 7, 9, 2007 Or. Laws 1143-47.
67. Id. § 5(3), 2007 Or. Laws 1142.
68. Ballot Measure 49 Website, supra note 60.
69. OR. REv. STAT. § 195.305(1) (2007).
70. Id.
71. Id.§ 195.310.
72. JOHN D. Ec-EvERRIA & THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG, THE TRACK RECORD ON TAKINGS
LEGISLATION: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRACY'S LABORATORIES 8, 17-21, 24 (2008).

1294

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

does little to modify Measure 37.73 Whatever its significance, the impact of
Measure 49 on future regulations was absent from legislative debate or
campaign and press accounts of the law, and appears only at the end of the
official ballot summary and explanatory statement. 74 More relevant,
therefore, is what Oregonians thought they were voting for-limiting
owners to building a few homes on their land-not the complicated
behemoth they actually enacted.
On November 6, 2007, Oregonians approved Measure 49 by sixty-two
percent, an even wider margin than that by which they approved Measure
37.75 The county by county results are even more striking. Although a few
counties that had strongly supported Measure 37 (particularly Jackson and
Klamath counties in the south) almost as strongly opposed Measure 49,76
most counties that had supported Measure 37 now supported Measure 49.
This effect was particularly pronounced in Oregon's fertile Willamette
77
Valley, which alone accounted for 4397 of the 7462 Measure 37 claims.
These counties have much of the high-value agricultural land subject to the
most stringent development restrictions under Oregon law, and thus were
among the targets of protests against land use restrictions in the Measure 37
campaign. In many of these counties, the shift was even greater than that
for the state as a whole. In Yamhill County, for example, where 70% of the
electorate had supported Measure 37, 63% voted for Measure 49; in
Washington County, 61% had supported Measure 37 while 68% supported
Measure 49; in Polk County, 60% of voters had supported Measure 37
while 65% supported Measure 49; and in Marion County, 62% had
supported Measure 37 while 66% supported Measure 49.78 A similarly
73. Blumm & Grafe, supra note 26, at 364-65.
74. See H.B. 2640, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 4 (Or. 2007) (bill enacting
official ballot language).
75. Compare ELECTIONS Div., OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, Nov. 6, 2007, SPECIAL ELECTION

ABSTRACT OF VOTES, STATE MEASURE No. 49 (2007) [hereinafter MEASURE 49 VOTE],
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007/abstract/results.pdf (showing a
total of 1,155,374 votes on Ballot Measure 49), with ELECTIONS Div., OR. SEC'Y OF STATE,
Nov. 2, 2004, GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES, STATE MEASURE No. 37 (2004)
[hereinafter MEASURE 37 VOTE], available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf (showing a total of 1,739,668 votes on Ballot Measure 37). The
Measure 49 vote represents sixty percent of registered voters. See ELECTIONS DIV., OR.
SEC'Y OF STATE, STATISTICAL SUMMARY, 2007 NOVEMBER SPECIAL ELECTION (2007),

available at www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007/novO7stats.pdf. Even given Oregon's
relatively high voter participation rates, this seems an excellent turnout for a special election.
Although the turnout was only two-thirds that of the 2004 election, the 2004 vote on
Measure 37 was on the same day as the closely contested Bush-Kerry presidential election
while the 2007 election concerned solely Measure 49 and another ballot measure for an
increased tobacco tax. See Elections Division, Oregon Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 2007
Special Election, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
76. Compare MEASURE 49 VOTE, supra note 75, with MEASURE 37 VOTE, supra note 75
(showing that 62% of Jackson County voters supported Measure 37 and 60% opposed
Measure 49 while 75% of Klamath County voters supported Measure 37 and 67% opposed
Measure 49).
77. RICHMOND & HOUCHEN, supra note 53, at 11 (listing claims by region).
78. Compare MEASURE 49 VOTE, supra note 75, with MEASURE 37 VOTE, supra note 75.
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stark shift was seen in Clackamas County, which had received the most
claims of any county: 79 although 64% of voters had supported Measure 37
in 2004, three years later 65% voted for Measure 49.80
The ultimate impact of Measure 49 is unclear. The promised "fast track"
for existing claimants has proved far from fast. The exception for waivers
that had ripened into vested rights has generated much litigation, with some
claims being granted and others not. 81 Oregon continues to debate its land
use regulations, with a Big Look Task Force charged with examining its
land use system as a whole. 82 But the bottom line is that Measure 37's
radical revolution in property rights is largely defunct, replaced with a law
that makes incremental, not radical, change to Oregon's land use system.
The remaining sections discuss how the experience under the law informs
contemporary debates about the theory and practice of takings law.

79. RICHMOND & HOUCHEN, supra note 53, at 20-22 (charting number of claims in
Willamette Valley counties).
80. Compare MEASURE 49 VOTE, supra note 75, with MEASuRE 37 VOTE, supra note 75.
81. See, e.g., Corey v. Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev., 184 P.3d 1109 (Or. 2008)
(denying claim); Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Jefferson County, 188 P.3d 313 (Or.
Ct. App. 2008) (same); Frank v. Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev., 176 P.3d 411 (Or. Ct.
App. 2008) (same); AnneMarie Knepper, Vesting Claims All Processed,Linn Says, ALBANY
DEMOCRAT-HERALD

(Or.),

Sept.

7,

2008,

http://www.democratherald.com/

news/local/article e928081d-f807-5c75-a748-624474879471.html (stating that of forty-three
vested rights claims filed, thirty-eight were granted). In a somewhat more bizarre decision, a
federal district court declared that in invalidating the previous Measure 37 waivers, Measure
49 violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Citizens for Constitutional Fairness
v. Jackson County, Civ. No. 08-3015-PA, 2008 WL 4890585, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2008).
The court found that the waivers were "contracts" not to continue litigation, and so could not
be invalidated by Measure 49. The brief unpublished opinion is unlikely to be followed in
other cases. The regulatory waiver is only loosely analogized to a settlement, and even more
loosely to a binding contract characterized by consideration and mutual exchange of
promises. The Contract Clause, moreover, is not an inexorable restriction even on
obligations deemed contracts, but rather is subject to the states' police power to protect
public health, safety, and welfare. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
241-42 (1978); U.S. Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). Thus even clearly
contractual obligations, such as a state railway charter providing that the railway would be
immune from suits arising from injuries of its employees, Texas & N.O. R.R. Co. v. Miller,
221 U.S. 408, 415 (1911), and remedies for defaulting purchasers of state land, El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965), may be amended when necessary to serve an overriding
public interest. The grant of a land development permit, while it may give rise to a vested
rights claim if sufficient action is taken in reliance on the permit, is sufficiently far from
traditional contract obligations and sufficiently tied to traditional exercises of police power
to adjust regulation of land use that other courts are unlikely to break new ground in finding
a Contract Clause violation.
82. OR. TASK FORCE ON LAND USE PLANNING, FINAL REPORT TO THE 2009 OREGON

LEGISLATURE (2009) (reporting on comprehensive assessment on Oregon land use system
and recommending modest changes); Peter Wong, Lawmakers Take Another Look at Rules
for Land Use-Oregon's Urban-Rural Conflict Is Decades Old, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.),
Feb. 1, 2009, at IA.
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II. WHAT OWNERS WANT-INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS

Perhaps the most important outcome of the brief life of Measure 37 is the
way it transformed owners' understandings of what their property rights are
and what creates them. Property is commonly understood as the result of
individual hard work and the arena of individual action; regulation of
property, in contrast, is understood as governmental confiscation of the
fruits of individual labor.
This Part explains the reasons for this
understanding and the ways that Measure 37 flipped it, making many come
to believe that regulations were a part of their property rights rather than a
deprivation of them.
A. Measure 37 and Oregonians'Articulationsof PropertyRights
Popular understandings of property rights form an important part of
takings law. Whether an action will be deemed to require compensation
depends, the Supreme Court has declared, in part on the "expectancies
embodied in the concept of 'property,"' 83 "the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of
rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property," 84 and the
"rigidity to our conception of our rights in it."' 85 Some scholars argue that
such popular understandings, rather than technocratic arguments about
efficiency and governmental behavior, properly underlie most takings
jurisprudence. 86 But the popular understanding of property is hard to pin
down; it shifts in different contexts and with different eras. 87 The Oregon
experiment, by abruptly removing the background rules provided by land
use regulations, provided a new context within which to evaluate that
understanding.
Although progressive scholars point out that "property" itself, in the
sense of possessions protected by law from expropriation or invasion, owes

83. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
84. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
85. Blockv. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
86. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-67, 189

(1977) (arguing that much of takings law may be understood by taking the position of the
Ordinary Observer, and that the U.S. Constitution embeds a principle of evaluating property
according to ordinary social practice).
87. As many have noted, the notion that regulations comprise a compensable diminution
of property rights has only emerged in the last century. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) ("Our jurisprudence
involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic ....Our regulatory
takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage ....
").Others have noted that
underlying conceptions of property, and with them property law, shift over time. See, e.g.,
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 32-34

(1977) (describing shift from a natural use to a first development theory of property); Sax,
supra note 49, at 1442 (describing emergence and dominance of a "transformative economy"
of property and the challenge now posed by a developing "economy of nature" model).
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its existence to the government, 88 this concept usually finds little resonance
with owners. 89
There is something basic-whether its origins are
instinctual or cultural-in the notion of "mine" that attaches to physical
possessions and that sees the power of others over those possessions as
inappropriate interference to be vigorously resisted. 90 Therefore it is not
surprising that protection against "takings" is a fundamental legal right in
almost all countries, 9 1 but demands for individual payment for "givings,"
governmental contribution to property values, play almost no part in our
jurisprudence. 92 Condemnation of a strip of my land to build a golf course
strikes at who I am as a citizen and human being; multiplication of the
value of my land because it now borders the lovely golf course is a matter
of luck or savvy investment, not obligation.
Measure 37 shifted this instinctual calculus. Voters went into the 2004
election seeing land use laws as governmental imposition on property; by
2007, they saw them as part of their property. Essentially, the effective
repeal of regulation threw the "givings" side of the land use regulation
equation from unseen background into sharp relief. 1000 Friends of
Oregon, the group that spearheaded the campaigns against Measure 37 and
for Measure 49, recognized that abstract arguments about land use laws
would not have accomplished this. As Eric Stachon of 1000 Friends said,
"Our side probably could have spent another million and still not been
successful .... Because it was the personal stories. I think it's going to be
radically different this time." 93 And they got stories. During the hearings,
the legislature was overwhelmed as Oregonians "flood[ed] the Capitol...

88. See, for example, the famous definition that Felix Cohen proposed and then
challenged:
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on PrivateProperty,9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374, 378-79 (1954).
89. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 280-82 (1998)
(discussing gap between intuitive understanding and legal definition of property).
90. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1483-85 (1998) (discussing
empirical evidence of "endowment effect" that makes individuals place higher value on
physical possessions); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.

957 (1982) (discussing ways that control over physical things contributes to personal selfactualization); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1143
(1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS (1995)) ("There is just something about land that makes you think that when you
own it, it is really, really yours."); Williams, supra note 89.
91. Fischel, supra note 34, at 59.
92. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549-50
(2001) (discussing elision of givings in property jurisprudence).
93. Oppenheimer, supra note 23.
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to deliver the kind of angry, pleading and tearful speeches you'd expect on
94
abortion and same-sex marriage."
This testimony made clear that many, even many of those who had voted
for Measure 37, now saw it as fundamentally unfair.95 Andra Bobbitt of
Seal Rock came to the capital "to testify about the unfairness Measure 37 is
spreading throughout our state," declaring that the condominium-hotelresort a Measure 37 claimant planned for her quiet coastal town "is not fair
to every other property owner in this residential neighborhood. '96 Ellen
Nawrocki wrote the committee that Measure 37 "is unfair to all neighbors
and the citizens of this state" and made "a mockery of everything this great
state once stood for." 97 Dale Siefert and Mary Blankevoort, whose rural
community was subject to large claims that would double the population
and traffic in the area, asked, "Where is the fairness for those of [us] who
cherish this region's unique natural and agricultural resources and its rural
lifestyle?" 98
Rozelle Burcher of Falls Creek was perhaps most explicit in attacking
Measure 37 as an assault on property rights:
First off, I'm not against a property owner's rights-as long as
wielding his rights does not trample on MY rights. Affecting the lifestyle
I chose for my family by moving to this rural area, affecting my quality of
life (I didn't buy my property expecting to be surrounded by bulldozers,
nasty runoff, and nosy neighbors), affecting MY perceived value of my
property (I could have spent the same amount for a bigger, nicer house in
a subdivision in town, but that was not valuable to me), affecting me and
my family in a negative manner is NOT okay-how are our rights less
than his?... Neighbors' rights need near equal weight. Period. 9 9
Steve Rouse, who represented 700 community members petitioning against
two mines proposed in their wine growing community, echoed this
sentiment: "The property rights that were supposedly defended by Measure

94. Laura Oppenheimer, Public Demands Land-Use Clarity, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 2007,
at Al.
95. See, e.g., E-mail from Rozelle Burcher to Senator Kurt Schrader (Apr. 10, 2007) (on
file with author) (saying when she saw the advertisements for Measure 37, she thought it
would be a good thing if a farmer could build a house or two for his kids, but "[n]eighbors'
rights need near equal weight"); Letter from Cindy Tyree, Freestyle Farm, Wilsonville, Or.
to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with author) (writing
that she voted for Measure 37 because she thought it would allow people to build one or two
homes, not subdivisions, and she wants to be able to vote again).
96. Hearing on S.B. 588, S.B. 1019, H.B. 3153, H.B. 354, Before the Joint Comm. on
Land Use Fairness [hereinafter Hearing], 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007)
(statement of Andra Bobbitt).
97. E-mail from Ellen Nawrocki to Senator Kurt Schrader, Joint Special Comm. on Land
Use Fairness (Apr. 1, 2007) (on file with author).
98. E-mail from Mary Blankevoort to Representative Patti Smith et al., Joint Special
Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Mar. 18, 2007) (on file with author).
99. E-mail from Rozelle Burcher to Senator Kurt Schrader, Joint Special Comm. on
Land Use Fairness (Apr. 10, 2007) (on file with author).

2009]

EVIDENCE FROM THE OREGON EXPERIMENT

1299

37 have turned against the rights of the majority in this community." 10 0
Similarly, Sharon Konopa insisted, "Government regulation gives all
citizens protection of their property rights. All Oregoniansproperty rights
are being violated by allowing M3 7 with these framework amendments and
its destruction of our land use laws." 10 1 Opponents of Measure 37 were in

agreement: property owners had an entitlement to the land use laws that
preserved the communities in which they purchased land; lifting of those
laws unfairly undermined that entitlement.
The selective repeal of land use laws undermined the investment value of
property as well. Paul Farmer, Executive Director of the American
Planning Association, summed up the situation: "People can no longer
make investment decisions or purchase their house, which is their largest
single investment, with any certainty that the neighborhood values will be
protected. They have no idea what may occur next door or across the
street." 10 2 Marilyn Allen, a composer, had purchased her home because
zoning restrictions prevented subdivisions under 160 acres; she knew that
zoning could change, but believed that "that it would change fairly and be
the same for all, enabling us to move away should this happen"; the
piecemeal removals of restrictions caused by Measure 37, however, would
greatly devalue properties like hers, which were not eligible for a waiver,
making it "exceedingly difficult if not impossible to afford another quiet
03
place."1
These concerns were even more pressing for farmers. David Setniker,
whose family had farmed his land since 1942, testified that if the Measure
37 claims surrounding him were developed,
my ability to farm my land will be greatly diminished and my land values
will be greatly decreased. I too have property that would qualify for 37
claims. But why should I be penalized for being a good steward of the
land, and for
trying to keep the farm intact to pass on the future
104
generations?

Victoria Avery and Michael Atherton, who had started their farming
business in 1991, similarly asked, "Where is the justice for those of us who
make their livelihood from farming and who purchased ground because of
the zoning laws and the protections they offer?" 10 5
Many citizens, of course, did oppose repeal of Measure 37. Some spoke
specifically of the resources they had already expended to develop their
100. Letter from Steve Rouse to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr. 18,
2007) (on file with author).
10 1. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Sharon Konopa).
102. Challenges to Oregon Laws Aimed at Controlling Urban Development (NPR radio
broadcast, Apr. 26, 2005) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
103. Letter from Marilyn Allen et al. to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr.
7, 2007) (on file with author).
104. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of David Setniker).
105. Letter from Victoria Avery and Michael Atherton to Senator Floyd Prozanski and
Representative Gregory Macpherson, Comm. for a Better Measure 37 (Apr. 17, 2007) (on
file with author).
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property in reliance on successful Measure 37 claims. 106 Others argued that
land development by successful claimants would create jobs and increase
prosperity. 10 7 A number vigorously defended Measure 37 as a vindication
of property rights. 108
Loydee Stonebrink told the committee that
"[p]roperty rights are as sacred as the sunrise and sunset. If [t]hat stops, so
does life,"' 0 9 while Glen Stonebrink called Senate Bill 588 a "case of
Prostitutionof our Constitutions."1 1 0 Thomas McDonald, who wanted to
build a tasteful dude ranch on his land, claimed that as the nation was
fighting for freedom in Iraq "we also shall be dictated to by a minority who
despise property rights, just like the Iraqi people are today, by the 1000
FRIENDS OF AL-QAIDA."' I Harkening to an older foreign boogie man,
Ronald Whitelaw asked, "Is this the USA or the USSR? '" 1 2 But these
voices were outnumbered in the hearings and no longer commanded public
opinion in the campaign that followed.
B. Reverberations Outside Oregon
The reaction against Measure 37 spread beyond Oregon's borders.
Washington State voted on a similar measure in 2006.113 Initiative 933
would have required compensation or waiver for loss due to restrictions
enacted after 1995, the year Washington began to implement a land use
scheme similar to Oregon's."l 4 Although early polls revealed that fifty-five
percent of the electorate supported the initiative, voters ultimately rejected
it by fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent. 115 Stories from the experience
under Measure 37 were central to the campaign, with Washington
newspapers declaring that "Oregon could foretell our land use destiny. 11 6

106. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 96 (statement of George Hansen); id.(statement of
Jess R. Moses); id.
(statement of Bob Homing).
107. See id.
(statement of Rita Swyers); E-mail from Paul Serres to Senator Kurt Schrader
et al., Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Mar. 13, 2007) (on file with author); see
also Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of David Duncan) (arguing that Oregon's land use
laws were inappropriate for the current economy of Oregon).
108. See, e.g., Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Thomas A. McDonald) (stating that

Measure 37 should "be remembered and honored, as the restoration of the owners' property
rights at the time of purchasing"); Letter from Charles D. & Kay Simmelink to Senator
Roger Beyer et al., Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with
author) ("Please understand that in the 1970's the Oregon State Legislature took away our
rights as property owners to do as we wished with our land.").
109. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Loydee Stonebrink).
110. Id. (statement of Glen Stonebrink) (submitted as part of statement of Loydee
Stonebrink).
111. Letter from Thomas A. McDonald to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness

(Mar. 6, 2007) (on file with author).
112. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Ronald D. Whitelaw).
113. Roesler, supra note 17.
114. Id.
115. See Bruce Ramsey, Despite Losses, Property-Rights Fight Is Far from Over,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at B6.

116. Roberts, supra note 2; see also Roesler, supranote 17.
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Initiative
Less neutral local headlines used the Oregon story to condemn' 1 18
117 and a "development 'monster."'
dog"
"snarling
a
933 as hiding
Similar measures were also on the ballots in Idaho, California, and
Arizona that November. 119 These initiatives were designed to implement
the strategy of the libertarian Reason Foundation, which proposed putting
"Kelo-plus" measures before the voters in order to take advantage of the
backlash against Kelo v. New London 120 by joining a prohibition on eminent
domain for economic development to a compensation requirement for
future land use restrictions. 12 1 These measures were purely prospective,
and thus more moderate than Measure 37; indeed they more closely
resembled Measure 49.
The Kelo-plus strategy should have been a successful one. In other
elections that day, pure anti-Kelo constitutional amendments passed with
eighty percent support in Georgia, New Hampshire, Michigan, and South
Carolina. 122 Of the three Kelo-plus measures, however, the only one to
pass was that in Arizona, 123 where the press had little discussion of the
Oregon experience. In contrast, Idaho's Kelo-plus proposal went down in
flames. 124 Press coverage and letters to the editors of Idaho newspapers
highlighted the links between Proposition 2 and Measure 37.125 One local
politician even echoed Oregonians in declaring that "[P]roposition 2 will
take away property rights, not protect them." 126 When they went to the
polls on November 7, 2006, seventy-six percent of the relatively
conservative Idaho electorate voted to defeat Proposition 2.127 The same
day, Californians voted on Proposition 90, also an anti-Kelo measure joined
to a requirement of compensation for future regulatory restrictions. 128 A
117. Ray Ring, PatrioticPitch Hides SnarlingDog, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept.
17, 2006, http://www.seattlepi.com/opinion/285287_focusl 7.html.
118. Tom Koenninger, Ballot Gets Development 'Monster,' COLUMBIAN (Vancouver,
Wa.), Aug. 9, 2006, at C7.

119. Ramsey, supra note 115. Proponents tried to get similar measures before voters in
Oklahoma, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada. Rocky Barker, Proposition 2 Opposition Is

Widespread, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), Oct. 8, 2006, at 1. The Missouri measure failed to
get enough signatures and the state courts struck the other three from the ballot as misleading
or otherwise in violation of state requirements. Id.
120. 546 U.S. 469 (2005).
121. Ray Ring, Taking Liberties, BOISE WEEKLY, Aug. 23, 2006, at 13.
122. Leonard Gilroy, By a Landslide, Americans Voted To Protect Their Property Rights,
BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 19, 2006, at 12.
123. Prop 207 Has Local Officials Worried, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.azdailysun.com/articles/2006/10/20/news/20061020 news 22.txt.
124. See, e.g., Rocky Barker, Oregon Tried Law Like Prop 2 in 2004, IDAHO STATESMAN
(Boise), Nov. 2, 2006, at Main 1; Ramsey, supra note 115. A similar limitation on eminent
domain had already been enacted by statute by the Idaho Legislature. Barker, supra.
125. See Barker, supra note 124; Ring, supra note 121; Lora Volkert, Oregon a Glimpse
of Idaho's Future,IDAHO BUS. REV., Oct. 9, 2006.
126. Vern Bisterfeldt, Proposition2 Will Take Away Property Rights, Not Protect Them,
IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), Oct. 23, 2006, at 6.

127. Ramsey, supra note 115.
128. Chuck DeVore, California Conservatives Wage Ballot Battle To Protect Private
Property,HUM. EVENTS, Oct. 30, 2006, at 9.
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month before the election, polling data suggested that the proposition
"strikes a chord in the heart of voters disgusted by the Kelo decision," and
was running ahead by as much as three to one. 129 Again, however, local
newspapers recalled the Measure 37 experience, 130 and Proposition 90 too
went down, albeit by only fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent. 13 1 While
the degree of unassuaged anti-Kelo sentiment appeared to play a significant
role in these votes (in Arizona, the governor had just vetoed anti-Kelo
legislation, 132 the California legislature had defeated it, 133 and the Idaho
legislature had already enacted a weaker anti-Kelo measure 134) the story of
the Oregon experience powerfully impacted voter perceptions of property
135
rights outside its borders.
C. Conclusion
It would be a mistake to see Measure 49 or the initiative contests in other
states as a simple enactment of public will. Others have noted the
disconnect between voter understanding and the legal effect of popular
referenda; 136 voters themselves testified to their misunderstanding of
Measure 37;137 and similar misunderstandings surely categorized voting in
Measure 49. As discussed in Part I, the legal effect of Measure 49 was only
poorly described during the campaign period. Nor was Measure 49
necessarily the preferred choice of those that voted for it; several of those
testifying, for example, remarked that they would rather see claimants
limited to one house per property. 138 In addition, while the final vote, sixtytwo percent in favor to thirty-eight percent opposed, seems overwhelming
as measured against close-fought presidential elections, almost two out of
five voters remained opposed to Measure 49. The seemingly decisive shift
129. Id
130. See, e.g., Meg Caldwell, Prop 90 Would Doom Coast to Over-Development, SAN

JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, at 18A; Patrick Hoge, Oregon Experience Cited in
Property Rights Debate, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 2006, at A9; Lisa Vorderbrueggen,
Community vs. Individual: Debate Turns on Landowners' Rights Balanced Against Ability
of Community To Improve or Protect Its Land, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (E. County ed.), Oct.
17, 2006, at Al.
131. Ramsey, supra note 115.
132. Prop207 Has Local Officials Worried, supra note 123.
133. Ramsey, supra note 115.
134. Barker, supra note 119.

135. Stories of Measure 37 dominated the unsuccessful 2007 campaign to pass a similar
measure in Alaska's Matanuska-Wanitsa Borough as well. See Rindi White, Land-Use
Debate Looks to Oregon: Prop 1: Friends, Foes of Ballot Issue Justify Stance Based on
Outside Effects, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007, at JI.
136. John Gastil, Justin Reedy & Chris Wells, When Good Voters Make Bad Policies:
Assessing and Improving the Deliberative Quality of Initiative Elections, 78 U. COLO. L.

REV. 1435, 1441-66 (2007).
137. See supra note 96.

138. Hearing, supra note 96 (statement of Sue Anne Henneck); Letter from Sarah
Deumling to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use (Apr. 17, 2007) (on file with author); Letter
from Sharon Konopa, City Councilor of Albany, Or. to Senator Floyd Prozanski &
Representative Gregory Macpherson, Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr. 17,
2007) (on file with author).
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between 2004 and 2007, moreover, reflects only a shift of twenty-three
percent of the electorate, less than one out of four voters. Oregon as a state
remains significantly divided over questions of property regulation and
compensation, and most voters likely did not fundamentally change their
opinions on these questions as a result of their experience under Measure
37.139

Despite this, a significant majority of voters seemed to be in agreement.
While many believed that property owners should be able to build at least
one home on their property, most saw governmental land use restrictions as
part of their property rights as well. 140 Regulation preserved what they
valued about their communities, protected their investments in their
property, and prevented unfair violation of those values by their neighbors.
In 2004, most Oregonians had agreed that land use restrictions were a
violation of property rights. 14 1 By 2007, most had come to believe they
were an integral part of those rights.
III. WHAT GOVERNMENTS DO-COMPENSATION AND EFFICIENCY

The second important facet of the implementation of Measure 37 is what
it suggests about governmental responses to compensation requirements.
The classic economic argument for enhanced compensation is that if
governments are forced to provide compensation for regulatory deprivations
of value they will internalize the costs of such deprivations and make more
efficient decisions. 14 2 This truism fell on its face under Measure 37. The
facts are simple: out of 7462 claims filed under Measure 37, in only one
known case did the state or local government agree to compensate rather
than waive the restriction, despite significant evidence that the waivers
would result in uncoordinated and detrimental use of property.143 Although
this will surprise neither political scientists nor political actors, the
continued widespread adherence to the efficiency-generating effects of a
compensation requirement makes it important to discuss the nature and
reasons for this result.

139. Dorothy English, for example, our infamous gravelly voiced poster widow, became
only more committed to freedom from governmental regulation of property use, insisting
that not only could she build a multi-unit subdivision on her land, but that she did not need to
comply with any state permitting procedures because they also did not exist in 1953 when
she and her husband purchased their land. Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 'Hero' Faces a
New Battle, OREGONIAN, Feb. 2, 2007, at C1.
140. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 186-87 ("If the state need not
compensate for restrictions, then it will impose too many of them. If there are too many
restrictions, then resources will not be put to their highest-valued use. Thus, uncompensated
restrictions result in inefficient uses."); see also EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 35,
at 119 ("If by chance, the diffuse social gains do outweigh the localized costs, then the
'winners' should be able to push the condemnation measure through, with compensation.").
143. See Prineville Writes FirstMeasure 37 Check, supra note 12.
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A. Measure 3 7 Claims andEfficient Decision Making?
The argument that compensation is necessary to ensure that
governmental actors regulate efficiently is the "dominant economic
approach" to the takings debate. 144 The appeal of the argument is plain. If
governments need not compensate for property regulation, they need not
fully account for its costs and will enact regulations whose costs outweigh
their benefits. 145 Despite important attacks on the accuracy of this
assumption, 146 the salutary efficiency effects of compensation requirements
maintain their hold on academic debate. In fact, they gained new
prominence in the furor following Kelo as leading property scholars
suggested that increasing the compensation required for takings would act
47
to deter otherwise "questionable" projects. 1
Although in populist property rhetoric rights and fairness arguments
dominate over economic ones, the efficiency argument has considerable
salience with the public as well. Colleen Fluetsch, for example, one of the
more determined citizen opponents of Measure 49, captured this argument
in one of her many letters to the Land Use Fairness Committee:
"Reasonable compensation is the ONLY THING that will guarantee
144. Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of
Compensationfor Takings, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 188, 190 (2006).
145. A leading law and economics textbook provides a succinct statement (along with
italics) of this principle: "Obviously, the noncompensabilityof regulationsgives government
officials an incentive to overregulate, whereas the compensability of takings makes
governmental officials internalize the full cost of expropriatingprivate property." COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 10, at 188-89; see also Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 621 (1984)
(describing government decision making in absence of compensation requirement as
operation under a "fiscal illusion"). Scholars have of course contributed important
complexities to the efficiency justification for compensation requirements.
Frank
Michelman, in an article that remains the starting point in takings theory, recognized that
analysis of the costs and benefits of a project must also include the demoralization costs to
owners whose property is taken without compensation and the settlement costs of identifying
and negotiating compensation. See Michelman, supra note 35. Michael Heller and James
Krier more recently pointed out that deterring inefficient decisions did not require that the
costs imposed on governments go to property owners, thus separating the efficiency
argument from fairness arguments for compensation. Heller & Krier, supra note 35. The
dominant view also recognizes that full compensation for regulatory restrictions may
encourage property owners to engage in investment without concern for whether the state
will eventually restrict them, thus encouraging potentially wasteful investment. See COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 10, at 187.
146. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 11; Kaplow, supra note 11; Levinson, supra note 11.
147. The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Thomas A.
Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfn?id=1 612&wit id=4661
(suggesting
greater compensation to provide added deterrence to all eminent domain projects); James E.
Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859, 865-73. One such
scholar has since recanted, providing an excellent discussion of the greater salience of
political over economic concerns in planning projects as well as the significantly abovemarket compensation provided to takees. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political
Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101 (2006).
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reasonable and just land use laws," she wrote. 148 "Our system is what
happens when there is no need for compensation to the land owners. It has
gone way overboard and become a monster!" 149
Despite the widespread adherence to this view, there is no evidence that
the compensation requirement caused state and local officials to weigh the
costs and benefits of the restrictions to determine which were efficient.
Rather, in all but one of thousands of claims, they simply waived the
restrictions rather than compensate. These waivers were made despite
predictable negative economic consequences. Measure 37 claims were
concentrated on high-value farmland, the basis of Oregon's 4.6 billion
dollar agricultural industry. 150 After mapping these claims, the Oregon
Department of Agriculture found that they would have "major implications"
for agriculture. 15 1 The development of the claims would, the Department
concluded, result in a "swiss cheese effect" of agricultural and
nonagricultural land that would generate significant land use conflicts. 152
In addition, patchwork residential development would threaten necessary
agricultural growth by eliminating parcels of land that could be purchased
153
to expand existing farms.
Farmers provided passionate testimony on the economic impact of the
Measure 37 waivers. Larry Martin, a fruit grower in Oregon's fertile Hood
Valley, told the Committee that "planning and zoning are not bad words but
are necessary concepts in a maturing society," and that if farms were
surrounded by residential subdivisions, they would soon be "regulated out
of business."' 154 Gary Rhinehart, a Pendleton wheat farmer, testified that
the claims to build hundreds of homes within two miles of him would mean
drastic changes for the farm that had been in his family for over 150
years. 155 Bill Rose of Roselawn Seed, Inc., declared, "'This is some of the
best farmland in the world.... You're going to build houses on it, and

148. E-mail from Colleen Fluetsch to Senator Vicki Walker et al., Joint Special Comm.
on Land Use Fairness (Mar. 13, 2007, 16:01 PST) (on file with author).
149. E-mail from Colleen Fluetsch to Senator Vicki Walker et al., Joint Special Comm.
on Land Use Fairness (Mar. 15, 2007, 09:59 PST) (on file with author).
150. Press Release, Or. Dep't of Agric., ODA Develops Maps To Show Impact of
Measure 37 Claims: Willamette Valley Farmland Faces Measure 37 Impact (Feb. 21, 2007),
availableat http://oregon.gov/ODA/docs/pdf/news/070221 measure37.pdf.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Gary Conklin, Oregon Winegrowers
Association). In an interesting comment on modem agriculture, a smaller but coordinated
group of farmers who reached their lands via small private airstrips sought protection against
noise complaints expected from the new residents. See id. (statement of David Martin,
President, Oregon Pilots' Association); id. (statement of Robert Severance, President,
Oregon Flying Farmers).
154. Id. (statement of Larry Martin); see also id. (statement of Don Schellenberg,
Associate Director of Governmental Affairs, Oregon Farm Bureau) (expressing concern
about carving up agricultural lots and seeking right to farm legislation to prevent nuisance
suits against farmers).
155. See id. (statement of Gary Rhinhart).
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pollute the streams?"' 156 The Oregon Winegrowers Association told the
Land Use Fairness Committee that the state's $1.4 billion dollar wine
industry "grew up under the protection of the state's land-use system and its
explicit promise that farmland was for farming," and Measure 37
undermined that protection. 15 7 Of course the timber industry, which had
provided most funding in support of Measure 37 and whose claims
comprised the largest portion of affected land, likely 158
opposed modification,
but as in 2004, they wisely remained relatively silent.
Claims were also granted without regard to their impact on water and
sewage systems. A significant number of claimants were granted the right
to build in areas where groundwater was limited and restricted by state
law. 159 Water and Electric Board officials for Lane County opined that the
planned developments could "imperil the quality of customers' drinking
water" in the county by escalating levels of fecal bacteria and other
contaminants in the system. 160 As many as 130 lawsuits were filed
1 61
challenging the impact of claims on area watersheds.
Although perhaps less compelling, the waivers also resulted in significant
economic impacts on surrounding owners. While a community-wide
relaxation of zoning restrictions might reduce the value of property for its
current use, those losses would be at least partially offset by the additional
flexibility in using one's land. 162 This was not true under Measure 37:
instead, property owners who had purchased after restrictions went into
163
effect would suddenly find their homes next to housing developments,
large hotels, 164 or even gravel mines, 165 but would be compelled by land
use restrictions to continue using their land as they had been. Unless the
state or municipality responded by lifting zoning restrictions across an area,
the land use conflict would have a permanent negative impact on the
surrounding properties.
It is of course possible that some of the regulations were inefficient. But,
although there is a vigorous debate about the efficiency of Oregon's
comprehensive land use laws, it does not appear that this--or any--debate
was a factor in the rulings.
Instead, the primary and often sole
156. Mary Pitman Kitch, This Landis Whose Land?, OREGONIAN, Feb. 11, 2007, at El.
157. Hearing, supra note 96 (statement of Gary Conklin, Oregon Winegrowers
Association).
158. See David Sarasohn, Editorial, Payingfor No: On Measures 49 and 50, the Money
Is the Message, OREGONIAN, Oct. 3, 2007, at F6.
159. JIM JOHNSON, OR. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEASURE 37 SLIDESHOW, available at
http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/NRD/docs/pdf/m37/m37_ppt.pdf.
160. Jeff Wright, Claims Spur Watershed Warning, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Feb.
8, 2007, at Al.
161. Id.
162. Letter from Marilyn Allen et al. to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr.
7, 2007) (on file with author).
163. Id.
164. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Andra Bobbitt).
165. Letter from Steve Rouse to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr. 17,
2007) (on file with author).
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consideration was whether the claimant met the legal requirements for
Measure 37. This, for example, is a description of the process in Marion
County:
[L]andowners must prove their ownership and that the ownership has
been continuous, and they must show that the land-use regulations have
hurt the value of their land. Landowners also must show that the
compensation they are seeking is reasonable. If they meet those
16 6
requirements, the commissioners grant waivers to land-use regulations.
The dominant factor in these decisions was the lack of existing funds to pay
compensation, as illustrated by the uniform justification the Lincoln County
Board of Commissioners proffered for their Measure 37 decisions: "the
Board finds it is in the public interest, due to the lack of resources to pay
compensation, to modify, remove or choose not to apply the challenged
land use regulation to the subject property and issue the 'waiver' to
67
claimants."1
Measure 37, in short, did not dispel a fiscal illusion. Instead, it resulted
in widespread and selective lifting of regulations, although the costs of
these actions likely outweighed their benefits. These decisions were
apparently made without consideration of their long-term economic
consequences; instead they responded solely to the immediate lack of funds
to pay owners for the losses claimed.
B. Measure 3 7 Decisions and PoliticalEconomy
Despite their divergence from cost-internalization theory, the decisions to
waive regulations rather than compensate were easily understandable as a
matter of political economy. As several scholars have pointed out, the
argument that requiring compensation enhances the efficiency of land use
decisions has little to do with the realities of governmental decision
making. 168 Governmental representatives are not like pure economic
actors, whose interests are neatly aligned with the profits of their firms. On
the benefit side, they do not (indeed ethically cannot) directly gain
economically from the benefits of their actions, which instead are
distributed to the public. 169 Wealth maximizing land use decisions will
presumably increase budgets, but only indirectly and only in the long run,
as creation of an attractive locale will increase revenues, whether from
property taxes on home values or on other taxes and fees imposed on
166. Timothy Alex Akimoff, Land-Use Claims Bury Marion and Polk County Staffs,
STATESMAN JOURNAL (Salem, Or.), Jan. 4, 2007, at IA.

167. In re Ballot Measure 37 Claim of Walter and Sara McGuire, No. 06-LURCC-06,
Order No. 11-06-380 at 2 (Bd. of Comm'rs for Lincoln County, Or., Nov. 8, 2006)
(approving claim to divide property into up to eighty one-acre parcels); see also In re Ballot
Measure 37 Claim of Robert and Janice Foley, No. 147-LURCC-06, Order No. 9-07-708 at 3
(Bd. of Comm'rs for Lincoln County, Or., Sept. 12, 2007) (approving claim to divide
property into up to nine one-acre parcels).
168. See Farber, supra note 11, at 279; Levinson, supra note 11, at 345.
169. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 355.
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businesses and residents. So although compensation requirements may
deter officials by demanding a choice between the regulation and other
projects, the choice is not primarily between the costs and benefits of the
regulation itself.1 70 There may be distortions on the costs side as well, as
the government charged with providing compensation may not be the same
one making the land use decision. 17 1 Because the costs of compensation
are often pushed further up the governmental ladder-as states fund
municipal development projects while the federal government funds state
projects and so on-they often will be spread across a much broader group
72
than feels its benefits.1
Public choice theory provides another basis for questioning whether
economic costs and benefits provide an effective motivation for land use
decisions. Public choice theory suggests that governmental actors are less
interested in maximizing governmental budgets than in maximizing
political popularity and securing reelection.' 73 Although ideology and
beliefs about the public interest clearly play a role as well, 174 such beliefs
will understandably shift to favor those who can most powerfully express
their sense of the public interest. The most politically effective actions in
this light are not those that maximize benefit across a broad group, but
rather those that significantly affect a smaller group that is easily motivated
and coordinated to act on their concerns and that can therefore more
effectively command public attention. 175 Poster grandma Dorothy English
and the handful of determined property owners like her were therefore far
than any
more effective in mobilizing public sympathy and political activity
76
1
been.
have
could
analyses
cost-benefit
persuasive
of
number
The choice to waive rather than compensate makes sense even if one
understands governmental officials as perfectly rational and attuned to the
Economist William Fischel's
public interest in decision making.
170. See Kaplow, supra note 11, at 568-69.
171. Garnett, supra note 147, at 141-42.
172. Id.
173. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 33 (1991); Levinson, supra note 11, at 374.
174. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 173, at 29-33.
175. See Farber, supra note 11, at 289-90.
176. Some have even argued that in eminent domain cases, where the injury of
governmental action is clear and strong, the compensation requirement may actually
facilitate takings by placating an otherwise highly motivated and sympathetic opposition
group. See id. at 293-94. Timothy J. Brennan and James Boyd have interestingly used
political economy to argue that compensation should be paid for regulatory takings where
property owners are politically powerful and those they dub environmentalists are weak to
ensure that owners do not deter efficient regulation, but that compensation should not be
paid where environmentalists are strong, to ensure that land owners provide a counterbalance
in arguments regarding land use regulation. Brennan & Boyd, supra note 144, at 200.
Although a clever twist to the efficiency debate, the impossibility of jiggering the
compensation requirement according to an ex ante assignment of sides and their relative
strength in a debate, as well as the idea that efficient regulation will necessarily emerge from
debate between equally motivated opponents, suggests that this is at most an entertaining
thought experiment.
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"homevoter hypothesis" provides a strong challenge to the way public
choice theory applies to municipal decision making.177 Fischel argues that
although larger entities-states, the federal government, and large citiesmay be vulnerable to domination by coordinated interest groups,
municipalities of less than 100,000 people behave differently.1 78 Decisions
of such governments, he argues, are readily capitalized into property values
and property taxes, 179 so that homeowners are far more aware and involved
18 0
than either renters or voters in state, federal, or large city governments.
Officials in these communities, therefore, are extremely responsive to these
"homevoters"' interests in maintaining overall community property values,
18 1
and their decisions reflect this fact.
Fischel's vision of a local government that is exquisitely sensitive to the
impact of its decisions on home values provides an alternative argument for
why governments chose to waive land use restrictions rather than provide
compensation. If a regulation reduces the value of property or undermines
its income-generating potential, this will reduce the tax base of the
community. Governments feel this in reduced budgets, and homeowners in
turn feel this in a greater tax burden or reduced services, which will reduce
the value of their own homes. The regulation is nevertheless efficient, and
makes sense for the homevoter and the government, if the restriction creates
economic gains-by, for example, increasing the values of other properties
in the community-that outweigh those costs. But there is no reason that
the net gain should be enough both to compensate for the loss in the
community tax base from the reduction in property value and to pay the
affected owner directly for the costs. This in effect requires the community
to pay twice for the restriction: once for the losses that are already
capitalized into the value of all other properties, and again to pay the owner
for her personal loss. The regulation is still efficient, but no longer makes
fiscal sense for the government or the community unless the benefits of the
regulation are overwhelming. 182 Because only the rarest of restrictions
177. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS:
How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES

(2001).
178. Id. at4, 15.
179. Id. at 39-40.
180. See id. at 4.

181. Id. at89.
182. This insight may be translated to decisions of larger governments as well. Take, for
example, the infamous case of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), in which a historic preservation ordinance prevented the owners of Grand
Central Terminal from building a skyscraper atop their historic Beaux Arts building. The
rent from the proposed addition would have been three million dollars annually. Id. at 116.
Although the owner lost the value of this rent, the city lost the taxes on this additional
income and the economic benefits of this additional commercial space as well. The
ordinance reflected a long-term decision that the benefits of maintaining the integrity of New
York's historic structures surpassed the losses due to this sacrifice. To compensate Penn
Central for the loss in addition to foregoing the benefits of the added economic activity,
however, would effectively double the cost side of the calculus and almost certainly make
the ordinance inefficient.
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generate benefits that are more than double their costs, even an extremely
rational and informed official faced with a demand for compensation would
83
choose the waiver option instead. 1
The thousands of decisions to waive land use regulations rather than
compensate were thus rational when understood either through a public
choice lens or its median homevoter twist. The claimants were discrete
individuals objecting to infringement of their property rights, with the
power of a highly successful and passionate political campaign behind
them. Their neighbors often were not aware of the nature of their claims
until after they were granted, and the arguments in their favor were often
diffuse ones to preserve rural quiet or prevent potential future conflicts
between farmers and residential developments. In addition, because neither
the state nor municipal governments had any additional funding to
compensate Measure 37 claimants, 184 the alternative to waiver was to
deplete present budgets to maintain benefits that would be realized to the
community over generations.
Similarly, many localities had already
sacrificed substantial tax revenue in preserving land for agricultural use;
paying direct compensation beyond that would wipe out the benefits that
justified this sacrifice. The decision to dismantle, parcel by parcel, the land
use regime under which Oregon had thrived for thirty years, was entirely
predictable in these circumstances.
It is true that some factors creating the rush to waive rather than
compensate were unique to Measure 37. Officials were not faced with
claims for compensation arising in a steady, slow stream soon after the
regulations were enacted, as they would have been under a rule demanding
compensation for prospective regulations only. The smaller number and
chronologically diffuse occurrence of such claims would have made
compensation more feasible. 18 5 Under Measure 37, however, governments
were suddenly subject to demands for compensation by everyone whose
property had been restricted after they acquired it over the last several
decades. Even had the economic costs of providing compensation for

183. It is important to note that William Fischel himself supports broader compensation
for land use regulations, FISCHEL, supra note 177, at 284-85, but not for reasons that
undermine this use of his work. Fischel recommends compensation for land use regulations
that demand "supernormal" density, such as ten-acre lots, id. at 272-75, but not because he
believes that such restrictions are inefficient for the community imposing them. He writes
that local government desires to protect property values undermine regional and state
interests in providing housing and preventing sprawl, id. at 229-31, so that local
communities should be forced to pay when they wish to impose such restrictions, id. at 27475. The compensation requirement is thus a way of deterring land use decisions where local
and societal interests are not aligned.
184. Akimoff, supra note 166.
185. The lack of allocated funds for compensation was apparently a significant factor in
the decision to waive regulations. As an article describing the process in Marion and Polk
Counties described, "No county has paid compensation to landowners, because there is no
money to do so." Id. Of course, while the volume of claims made compensation without
allocated funds more difficult, it does not explain the failure of local governments to make
any attempt to determine if even a limited set of the regulations were worth maintaining.
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thousands of claims in a short period not been prohibitive, the
administrative costs of rationally deciding between claims would have
been. These factors surely stacked the deck in favor of waiver.
But the officials considering Measure 37 claims also had advantages in
evaluating the costs of waiver not enjoyed by those considering new
restrictions. The land use regime, and the communities it helped to create,
already existed; their economic and social benefits were clear. There was
also a ready-made source of political support for the regulations among the
property owners who would be so vocal in the successful fight to repeal
Measure 37.186 One of the witnesses before the Land Use Fairness
Committee reported that her community had spent almost $20,000 trying to
convince county commissioners that subdivisions claimed under Measure
37 would overwhelm the neighborhood's water supply; 187 another reported
that over 700 members of his farming community had signed a petition
opposing a Measure 37 claim to begin gravel mining in the area. 188 In
considering new regulations, in contrast, officials balance the conflicting
predictions of planners, environmentalists, and developers about the impact
of regulations, rather than evaluating an existing situation. In addition,
while under Measure 37 the automatic investment of owners in the status
quo favored maintaining the regulations, that popular attachment to the
status quo runs against adoption of new regulations. Thus, while some
aspects of Measure 37 claims favored waiver, other elements provided more
political support for maintaining the regulations than would have existed
189
had the measure's scope been limited to evaluation of future restrictions.
C. Paying the Palins
The single case in which a municipality decided to provide compensation
is also illuminating. The claim pitted Grover and Edith Palin (no known
relation) against Prineville, Oregon. Prineville is a small city in Oregon's
high desert, partly encircled by dramatic rimrock shooting up 300 feet from

186. Even here, however, the public was not effectively mobilized with respect to
individual claims. Most county hearings on Measure 37 claims appear to have been
unattended except for by the claimant; even in the Prineville Rimrock case no one besides
the Palins appeared to testify on the claim. Rachel Scarborough King, Next Steps Uncertain
in Prineville M37 Payout, BULLETIN (Bend, Or.), Oct. 25, 2006, available at Rachael
http://rachaelsking.blogspot.com/2006/1 0/next-steps-uncertain-inScarborough
King,
prineville-m37.html (Oct. 25, 2006, 11:04 PST).

187. Hearing,supra note 96 (statement of Laurel Hines & Brian Hines).
188. Letter from Steve Rouse to Joint Special Comm. on Land Use Fairness (Apr. 17,
2007) (on file with author).
189. This intuition regarding the chilling effect on future regulations is borne out by
studies of the impact of Florida and Arizona laws demanding compensation for new
regulatory restrictions. JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA & THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG, THE TRACK
RECORD ON TAKINGS LEGISLATION: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRACY'S LABORATORIES 8-9, 17-

21 (2008) (discussing regulatory chill caused by Florida's 1995 Bert Harris Act and
Arizona's Proposition 207).
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the valley floor. 190 The rimrock is part of what defines the city and is
featured on its citizens' business cards and websites. 19 1 In 1963, the Palins
purchased fifteen acres in Prineville that began on the valley floor but
sloped upward to include two acres of rimrock land. 192 They built their
home in the valley portion, and used the rest to graze their horses. 193 Forty
years later, the Palins decided they wanted to build their retirement home on
the rimrock overlooking the valley. 194 In 1978, however, Prineville had
prohibited construction within 200 feet of the rock face to prevent visual
disruption of the ridgeline. 195 The 200-foot setback cut from the Palins'
wedge-shaped two acres all but a small triangle of land too small to build
on. 196 The couple filed a Measure 37 claim demanding the right to build
97
within the setback area. 1
Rather than waive the restriction, the City Council decided to pay the
Palins $47,000, which the city's appraiser found was the amount by which
the building restriction reduced the value of the Palin land.198 The decision
would be understandable for students of public choice theory. Instead of a
choice between a determined property owner and a diffuse benefit to the
public, or even a determined property owner and a handful of equally
determined neighbors, the choice was between a single citizen and a highly
visible public symbol. Although even here, as the Palins noted, no one
from the community appeared at the council meeting on the claim, 99 in this
case the council was well aware of public opinion on the subject. As
Councilor Chet Peterson stated, "It was the overwhelming point that the
public made to us time and time again, 'We do not want to see homes on
the rimrock.' ' 200 Rick Steber, a Prineville-based Western writer, later
agreed in dramatic terms:

"[I]t's almost like a ransom ....

If you don't

pay, I'm gonna kill her--or, in this case, I'm gonna build on it."'20 1 From a
median homevoter perspective, moreover, the decision to compensate in
Prineville may be understood as one of those rare restrictions whose
190. Matthew Preusch, Prineville Offers Measure 37 Pay, OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2006, at

Al.
191. Mary Kitch, The Riddle of the Rimrock, OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 2007, at F1.
192. King, supra note 186. Grover Palin apparently purchased the land to graze his
horses and did not even realize at the time of purchase that it included rimrock land. Id.
193. Id.
194. Preusch, supra note 190.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. King, supra note 186.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Rachael Scarborough King, Prineville To Pay First M37 Claim, BULLETIN (Bend,
Or.), Oct. 18, 2006, available at Rachael Scarborough King, http://rachaelsking.blogspot.com/
2006/10/prineville-to-pay-first-m37-claim.html (Oct. 18, 2006, 11:22 PST); see also King,
supra note 186 (reporting statement of Councilor Bobbi Young: "I think the rimrock is
extremely important to this community, it's what defines it and to allow a home built that is
a visual blight, if you will, on that rimrock... would be a very tough thing for me to
accept.").
201. Kitch, supra note 191.
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aggregate benefits, given the community's reliance on the rimrock view,
were enough to both make up for the loss in value of the property base and
to directly compensate the Palins.
Equally interesting is the Palins' reaction to the decision:
fury.
Economists Timothy J. Brennan and James Boyd have argued that
providing compensation for regulatory restrictions may be a way to silence
those who would otherwise oppose efficient regulation. 20 2 Although
compensation will mitigate the opposition of some property owners, and is
even more likely to undermine public sympathy for their claims, it will
clearly not do so in all cases. (The best known recent example of this is
Susette Kelo, of Kelo v. City of New London fame, who swept up the nation
in a campaign against condemnation of her pink Victorian home despite the
constitutionally necessary offer of compensation. 20 3) Compensation was
certainly not enough for the Palins. "It wasn't the stupid money," Grover
Palin raged, "I didn't care about that. All I wanted to do is build a house up
there." 20 4 A month later, the Palins withdrew their initial claim and filed a
new one for the right to build a diner and either a motel or condominiums
on the entire fifteen acres. 20 5 "'Edith and I wanted a retirement home; we
didn't get it, so now if we don't get that we might as well see how much
money we can get,"' Grover said. "'I'm looking at pretty close to $5
million."' 20 6 Edith was equally defiant: "'If nothing else, we're going to
give (the City Council members) a headache .... We're not just going to
lay down and roll over."' 20 7 Again, however, the council voted to
compensate, this time upping the payout to $180,000.208 In September
2007, presumably aware of the likely passage of Measure 49, the Palins
2 09
agreed to accept the check.
D. Conclusion
However one explains it, governmental responses to Measure 37 claims
provide no support for the theory that requiring compensation will result in
more efficient regulation. Except in the unusual Prineville case, officials
routinely waived regulations rather than compensate property owners.
202.
203.
204.
205.
(Bend,

Brennan & Boyd, supra note 144.
545 U.S. 469, 475-77 (2005).
King, supra note 200.
Rachel Scarborough King, Prineville Pair Files Second M37 Claim, BULLETIN
Or.),
Nov.
29,
2006,
available at
Rachel
Scarborough
King,

http://rachaelsking.blogspot.com/2006/12/prineville-pair-files-second-m37-claim.html

(Nov.

29, 2006, 23:47 PST).

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Prineville Writes First Measure 37 Check, supra note 12. The difference in offers
was likely not a determination of the value of the parcel with hotel development rights, but
rather a resolution of the difference between the city's appraisal of the land with building
rights and a private appraisal the Palins had obtained. See King, supra note 200 (noting that
the city appraised the land at $60,000 with development rights, and $12,340 without, while
the Palin's appraisor valued the land at $195,000 with development rights).
209. Prineville Writes FirstMeasure 37 Check, supra note 12.
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These waivers created a patchwork of regulated and unregulated land that
undermined all beneficial effects of land use planning. Although some of
the pressures on officials in deciding these claims were unique to Measure
37, other factors supporting a choice to maintain the regulations existed that
would not be present in a compensation requirement for newly enacted
regulations. But while these piecemeal waivers were almost certainly
inefficient, they were nevertheless understandable, even predictable,
whether one believes the decision makers acted to maximize political power
or to serve the interests of the community as a whole.
IV. WHAT OWNERS DESERVE-COMPENSATION, VALUATION,
AND FAIRNESS

Even if compensation does not improve the efficiency of land use
decisions, it may be necessary as a matter of fairness and justice. As
Michael Heller and James Krier have noted, compensation requirements
serve both deterrence and justice interests, and the two are not necessarily
aligned. 2 10 A governmental action may be efficient, yet justice may
nevertheless demand that society rather than the individual bear the
costs. 2 11 Indeed, while much recent legal scholarship dwells on the
efficiency effects of compensation requirements, both the Supreme Court
and popular discourse focus instead on the fairness concern. 2 12 As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes declared in Pennsylvania Coal, the question is
usually not whether the need for the action exists but "upon whom the loss
of the changes desired should fall. '' 2 13 Or, in the words of Dorothy English,
"If the majority wants to save this stuff, then the majority should pay for
it.",2 14

There are two difficulties in determining what owners are entitled to as a
matter of justice or fairness. The first difficulty lies in measuring the losses
caused by regulatory actions. These difficulties were highlighted by the
Measure 37 claims and the research they catalyzed. 2 15 As this section
discusses, one cannot accurately assess the relevant net social impact of
210. Heller & Krier, supra note 35, at 1000.
211. 1 use the Kaldor/Hicks definition of efficiency, the definition most commonly used
in legal analysis, which defines an action as efficient if its benefits outweigh its costs.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 47-48. To be Pareto efficient, the action would have to
make society better off without making any individual worse off and, therefore, would
always require compensation of the losses of any individual. Id. at 17.
212. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 336 (2002) (describing regulatory takings test as seeking to determine "when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons"
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
213. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
214. Oppenheimer, supra note 14.
215. For a nice discussion of some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in
determining compensation in regulatory takings cases, see Christopher Serkin, The Meaning
of Value: Assessing Just Compensationfor Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677
(2005).
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governmental actions if one fails to account for the way such actions
enhance the value of the regulated property itself by providing valuable
amenities, preventing harmful externalities, and creating scarcity effects
that increase demand for unrestricted property.
The second difficulty is in determining what fairness itself requires.
Does justice give individuals claims against the state for whatever
economic losses its actions cause? Most would agree that an owner has no
fairness-based claim against the state for the economic losses caused
because he cannot grow marijuana on his land, but does have a claim as a
matter of justice if his home is taken to build a highway. In between, the
questions are harder to answer. Measure 37 raised one particular form of
this question: assuming that an owner accurately calculates the opportunity
costs of a regulation, does justice compel the state to pay this entire amount
if the owner is still making a healthy profit on the restricted land? Many of
the Measure 37 claims were for properties whose value with restrictions in
place had multiplied several times since their purchase; the owners
complained, however, that the property would be worth even more without
the restrictions. As discussed further below, it is not clear that fairness
demands compensation for the difference.
A. The With-and-Without Measure of Justice
In assessing the impact of land use restrictions, owners and courts
typically calculate the difference between the value of the land with the
restriction and its value if it could be developed as the owner wished to use
2 16
it. This was the standard measure of loss used by Measure 37 claimants.
Dorothy English, for example, claimed compensation for the difference
between the value of her land as a single parcel ($339,000) and subdivided
into eight parcels ($1.15 million)-a difference of $811,000.217 Grover and
Edith Palin did the same, initially demanding $180,000 for the loss they
claimed the 200 foot setback imposed on their rimrock property. Notably,
appraisers for Prineville and the Palins differed radically on their estimates
of the value lost, 2 18 and it is not clear which appraisal was more accurate.
The Supreme Court uses this measure of loss as well. In one of the first
regulatory takings claims, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 19 the
1926 case that upheld the constitutionality of zoning laws, the Court
described the affected parcel as worth $10,000 per acre if developed for
commercial and industrial purposes, but $2500 per acre if limited to

216. See, e.g., ATIYEH REPORT, supra note 53, at 4 (discussing Claim M1 19803, which
demanded $9.5 million in compensation for the difference in value between claimant's fiftyfour acres used as farmland and divided into ninety-seven half-acre lots).
217. See Eric Mortenson, Face of Measure 37 Campaign Still Stuck, OREGONIAN, Dec.
25, 2007, at D1.

218. See King, supra note 200; cf Serkin, supra note 215, at 683 (noting that even with
the same appraisal techniques appraisers can reach "wildly different results").
219. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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residential purposes. 220 Much later in a 2001 Supreme Court case, Anthony
Palazzolo would claim $3,115,000 from Rhode Island based on the amount
he alleged his wetland property was worth if it could be filled and
developed into seventy-four quarter-acre homesites as he wished, versus the
$200,000 in value he would retain if not.22 1 Such differences-a seventyfive percent loss in Euclid and a ninety-four percent loss in Palazzolo v.
2 2-lead commentators
Rhode IslandZ
to decry the unfairness of making the
individual rather than society bear the burden of "paying for the change. '223
As Oregon economists William Jaeger and Edward Plantinga argued in
papers analyzing Measure 37, such calculations measure only the negative
impact of the restriction, holding all other effects of governmental action
constant. 2 24
They fail to account, for example, for governmental
contributions
to
the value of the land, what law professors have called
"givings" 22 5 and economists call "amenity effects. ' 226 The value of
Oregon's low-density residential land was surely enhanced by its proximity
to green open spaces protected by its zoning laws. As many of the
claimants' neighbors testified, the development restrictions were
responsible for creating the communities they chose to live in. Similarly,
owners' contributions towards financing governmental water, waste
disposal, and road systems would reflect the degree of demand on such
2 27
systems.
Land may also benefit from its relationship to other governmental
amenities that are unavailable to properties not so situated. Palazzolo's
Rhode Island waterfront property, for example, gained much of its value
from its proximity to Misquamicut State Beach, a popular governmentowned and maintained recreation spot. 228 The Carolina barrier island
property of David Lucas, another takings plaintiff who took his case to the
220. Id.at 384.
221. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001). It appears, however, that
Anthony Palazzolo could not have developed the land as he wished even without the
wetlands laws; during the litigation the Town testified that zoning laws prohibited dividing
eighteen acres into seventy-four homesites. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 715 n.7 (R.I.
2000), rev'd, 533 U.S. 606.
222. 533 U.S. 606.
223. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
224. JAEGER & PLANTINGA, supra note 13; William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use
Regulations on Property Values, 36 ENVTL. L. 105 (2006); see also Keith H. Hirokawa,
Property Pieces in Compensation Statutes: Law's Eulogy for Oregon's Measure 37, 38
ENvTL. L. 1111, 1156 (2008) (noting that Measure 37 did not account for the positive effects
of zoning on land value); Serkin, supra note 215, at 695-96 (discussing the difficulty of
measuring the "benefit offset[s]" in regulatory takings cases).
225. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 92, at 549-50.
226. JAEGER & PLANTINGA, supra note 13, at 2; Serkin, supra note 215, at 695-96.
227. For example, a recent report by Oregon Land Watch calculated that the costs of
providing infrastructure and municipal services vastly outweigh tax revenue and other
benefits for Oregon's planned "destination resorts," for which the Legislature has relaxed
development restrictions. EBEN FODOR, FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DESTINATION
RESORTS

IN OREGON

(2009),

available at

http://www.centraloregonlandwatch.org/

files/Destination%20Resort%201mpact%20Study%2ORevised.pdf.
228. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
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Supreme Court, was valuable for residential purposes only because of
governmental development of infrastructure on the island and the
subsidized flood insurance and reconstruction assistance provided for
properties destroyed in hurricanes. 229 As farmers in exclusive farm use
areas testified in the Measure 49 hearings, their land value benefited not
only from the lack of conflicts with residential uses, but also from the
supply of other agricultural land suitable to purchase when expansion
became necessary 230 (and, presumably, the preservation of a market for
their land when sale was demanded).
Most Measure 37 claimants were also direct beneficiaries of
governmental largesse. The 1973 land use laws provided owners of
property zoned for farm and forest uses with significant tax benefits by
assessing their land at special assessment rates. 23 1 Between 1974 and 2004
municipalities gave up $4.8 billion in tax revenues from these agricultural
and forestlands. 2 32 These tax benefits, moreover, were capitalized into the
prices for specially assessed parcels, increasing the price for which they
sold. 233 None of this public investment in the maintenance of farm and
forest lands was incorporated in the damages asserted by Measure 37
claimants. While these effects will not always outweigh the losses caused
by land use restrictions, 234 they must be incorporated in any assessment of
what society owes an owner as a matter of fairness.
An even more fundamental error was the failure to account for the
scarcity effect created by the land use restrictions. Recall that Measure 37
claims were available only to those who had acquired the land before the
restrictions were imposed.
Under its waiver provisions, therefore,
individual parcels were suddenly permitted to engage in high-density
development while restrictions on surrounding properties remained the
same. As the only properties with such development rights, their value was
much higher than it would have been had zoning law permitted subdivision
229. Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine:
More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES
Morriss eds., 2009).
230. See, e.g., Hearing,supra note 96 (statement
Association).
231. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308A.50-.128 (2007)
§§ 321.259-290 (2007) (forestland taxation).

Using the Takings Clause To Promote
299 (Gerald Komgold & Andrew P.
of Gary Conklin, Oregon Winegrowers
(farmland taxation); OR. REV. STAT.

232. HENRY R. RICHMOND & TIMOTHY G. HOUCHEN, AM. LAND INST., OREGON'S PUBLIC
INVESTMENT IN CONSERVATION, PROSPERITY & FAIRNESS: REDUCED TAXATION OF FARM

LAND AND FOREST LAND 1974-2004, at 2 (2007).
233. In some cases, the governmental investment was even more specific. Gary Rhinhart,
a wheat farmer, testified to the Land Use Fairness Committee that most of the owners of
lands subject to Measure 37 claims in his area were paid by the federal government to have
their land planted with grass to protect water quality and protect wildlife habitats. "I see no
way they lost any value," he declared, "as they watch the grass grow." Hearing, supra note
96 (statement of Gary W. Rhinhart).
234. As discussed below, however, a study comparing properties in Oregon and
Washington suggested that, perhaps as a result of these amenity effects, restricted property
was actually more valuable than similar property without such restrictions. JAEGER &
PLANTNGA, supra note 13, at 2.
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of all surrounding properties. By failing to incorporate these scarcity
effects into their claims, Measure 37 claimants were effectively demanding
compensation as if they were entitled to a government-created monopoly to
235
develop land in the area.
Although it is relatively easy to calculate direct tax subsidies to the
property owner, calculating the amenity and scarcity impacts of
governmental actions would be a Sisyphean task.
While restricting
development of one's property reduces its value, the scarcity of
development rights of surrounding properties enhances it. How can the
negative impact of the restriction and the positive impact of the scarcity be
separated? Amenity effects pose a similar problem. How does one
calculate the value of neighboring open space to the property? The impact
of a thriving agricultural industry? The lack of exposure of residences to
agricultural noise and smells? The lack of restrictions on farmers by
unhappy homeowners? The reduction in sprawl with its increase in traffic
and costs in road maintenance? Although one could create an economic
model to attempt to do this, it would be difficult to have much faith in the
236
results of such a complicated counterfactual model.
Rather than seeking to account for such factors in the abstract, property
valuations are largely derived through analysis of prices fetched at recent
sales for similar properties. 237 Such prices will reflect the increase in the
value of the land due to the availability of public services, nearby amenities,
land use coordination through zoning, as well as the deductions due to land
use restrictions.
But because entire regions in Oregon-indeed, all
properties in the state-are affected by the comprehensive land use scheme,
there is no comparable property in the state. As Plantinga noted in 2004,
these difficulties are very different from those presented in physical takings
cases. 238 Where a parcel of land is condemned, appraisers assess the value
of an existing property in an existing market. To determine what the value
of the property would be in the absence of regulations, in contrast, is to
measure the value of an "unobservable hypothetical. '239
235. See ATIYEH REPORT, supra note 53, at 4-5.
236. For an article by an expert witness for Anthony Palazzolo on the battle over
valuation methods in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), see William W. Wade
& Robert L. Bunting, Average Reciprocity of Advantage: "Magic Words" or Economic
Reality-Lessonsfrom Palazzolo, 39 URB. LAW. 319 (2007).
237. Elli Pagourtzi et al., Real Estate Appraisal: A Review of Valuation Methods, 21 J.
PROP. INVESTMENT & FIN. 383, 386-88 (2003). This is the gold standard in determining
compensation for property as well. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 30
(1984) (stating that where there is a "robust market" for similar properties, the comparable
price method is to be preferred); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341,
345 (1923) ("'If it be an article commonly traded in on a market and it is shown that at the
time and place it was taken there was a market in which like articles in volume were openly
bought and sold, the prices current in such a market will be regarded as its fair market value
and likewise the measure of just compensation for its requisition."' (quoting United States v.
New River Collieries Co., 276 F. 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1921))).
238. Andrew J.Plantinga, Measuring Compensation Under Measure 37: An Economist's
Perspective (2004), http://arec.oregonstate.edu/faculty2/measure37.pdf.

239. Id.
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In order to overcome this problem, Plantinga and Jaeger joined to look
over the border to similar areas in the State of Washington. 240 While
Oregon adopted land use regulations in 1973, Washington did not do so
until 1990; even then its regulations were less centralized and less stringent,
and were not fully implemented for another decade. 24 1 Plantinga and
Jaeger first chose three Oregon counties, two (Lane and Jackson counties)
to the west and one (Baker) to the east of the Cascade Mountain range that
divides the state. 242 They then chose one western Washington county
(Lewis) and one eastern Washington county (Kittitas) based on their
similarity to the Oregon counties with respect to presence of urban centers,
243
population and income growth, agriculture, climate, and other factors.
Within the counties, parcels were divided according to whether they were
inside or outside urban growth boundaries, and for the western counties
according to their zoning category. 244 For the eastern counties, only
agricultural properties were selected. 245 Purchase prices of parcels within
the counties were then analyzed for each several-year period between 1972
and 2002.246 In the western counties, after adjusting for inflation, land
values in the Oregon counties increased at a significantly greater rate than
those in the Washington county, appreciating by 397% in Lane and 416% in
Jackson, as opposed to 349% in Lewis County. 247 The difference was even
more striking with respect to lands outside urban growth boundaries,
particularly for those restricted to exclusive farm use, where the
appreciation was 456% and 533% in Lane and Jackson Counties, but 293%
in Lewis County. 248 Appreciation in the eastern counties was far more
similar. The final average growth in Washington's Kittitas County was
higher than in Oregon's Baker County (69% growth versus 6% growth), a
difference the authors explain by their small sample size, but the growth in
24 9
median land value was identical.
The Jaeger and Plantinga study is hardly proof of the impact of land use
restrictions-as varying growth rates across the counties themselves show,
many factors other than land restrictions play roles in land appreciation.
But the study also provides no evidence that the restrictions seriously
impede land appreciation in Oregon, and may even suggest that it enhances
that value. If this is the case, why does fairness demand owners be

240. JAEGER & PLANTINGA, supra note 13, at 6.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 22.
248. Id.
249. The authors explain that this variation is due to the small and varying sample of
Baker County properties. Id. at 24. They also note that data compiled by the USDA
Economic Research Service suggest that farmland in Oregon has increased in value at rates
comparable to those in neighboring states and higher than the national average. Id. at 26.
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compensated for profits they claim they could realize in a hypothetical,
perhaps inaccurately imagined, alternative property regime?
B. The Before-and-After Measure of Justice
In crafting Measure 49, legislatures heeded Jaeger and Plantinga's
concerns, and the testimony of others based on them, and sought to rein in
exaggerated loss claims by land owners. To build more than three
houses 250 or to claim loss due to future restrictions, owners must provide
appraisals of the value of the property one year before the enactment of the
restriction claimed to have caused the loss and one year after its
enactment. 25 1 While this measure prevents the monopoly value claims
made by Measure 37 claimants, it contains other difficulties and fails to
resolve deeper fairness concerns in measuring compensation.
First, this measure raises practical concerns. Assuming that owners do
not have their property appraised every year, appraisals-never an exact
science-will still be subject to both the distortions of litigation and those
of comparing prices fetched for properties perhaps years before. 252 Second,
this measure assumes that any changes in value are due to land use
restrictions that give rise to the claims. As recent years have poignantly
shown, property can drop in value due to market fluctuations rather than
governmental actions. Similarly, measuring loss according to appraisals
conducted two years apart subsumes any market-based appreciation to
mitigate any losses caused by the restriction. In other words, unless the
appraisal also incorporates the change in value in all properties (resurrecting
the scarcity and amenity problems) governments that enacted restrictions at
the cusp of a housing collapse would find themselves compelled to
compensate owners for those losses as well, while those that enacted
regulations at the inception of a housing boom would have to compensate
owners little, if at all.
A deeper problem with this two-appraisal method is the stark
chronological line it draws between restricted and unrestricted property.
Zoning rarely radically contradicts existing land use; 253 rather, it seeks to
preserve and protect what is already valuable about the character of the
neighborhood and prevent change that threatens that value. At the time a
restriction is enacted, in other words, it reflects the dominant and valued use
of property in a community. This has both economic and fairness
implications. Economically, both scarcity and amenity effects likely
already exist. In a farming and low-density residential community on the
250. Ballot Measure 49, ch. 424, §§ 7, 9, 2007 Or. Laws 1138, 1143-47.
251. OR. REV. STAT. § 195.310 (2007).
252. As owners have five years from the date of the enactment of the regulation to file a
compensation claim, these appraisals may involve estimating the value of a property as much
as six years prior. Id. § 195.312(4).
253. Indeed, zoning law typically preserves the right of existing nonconforming uses to
continue. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES & PRACTICES 91925 (4th ed. 2006).
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verge of coming within reach of sprawl, for example, the value of a
property subdivided in smaller parcels is likely higher because of the
limited property put to such uses and the bucolic open spaces surrounding
it. The zoning law, by fixing existing low-density development and open
space, simply removes the ability of the claimant to take disproportionate
advantage of these effects in order to preserve them for the community as a
2 54
whole.
This observation leads directly to the fairness concern. By measuring
change in value as of the date the formal restriction is imposed, the Measure
49 calculation of compensation means that the community as a whole must
pay the claimant for foregoing the opportunity to violate the existing use
patterns that constitute the character of the community. Such claimants
seem more like Oliver Wendell Holmes's proverbial bad man, willing to do
whatever law permits that will gain him advantage, 255 than hapless poster
grandmas. The bad man is surely a useful figure in legal analysis but is
hardly a compelling claimant of societal compensation as a matter of
fairness and justice.
C. The Role of the Return on the Owner's Investment
If neither the with-and-without or before-and-after measures fully capture
the loss the individual can fairly claim against society, this raises questions
of what other measures should be considered. In particular, what role
should the return on the owner's investment play in determining the justice
or her claim against the state? In no case did the Measure 37 claimants
allege that the restrictions had reduced the value of the property beyond
what they had paid for it. Property values in the western counties Jaeger
and Plantinga studied multiplied four times between 1972 and 2002; the
value of properties zoned for exclusive farm or forest use appreciated at
even greater rates. 2 56 Dorothy English's property in the hills west of
Portland appreciated even more. She and her husband had purchased the
thirty-nine acres for $4500 in 1953.257 In 1974, they sold eleven acres for
$26,400, and in 1977 sold another nine acres for $27,000,258 effectively

reducing her investment in the remaining nineteen acres to $2250.
Although land use regulations prevented further division of that parcel, at
the time her face and voice were mobilizing Oregon's voters the assessed
value of the land was $339,000,259 150 times that initial investment, or 21

times in equivalent dollars. She had, moreover, already realized an
elevenfold return on the land from the sales in the 1970s. Does fairness
254. In addition, as Professor Christopher Serkin points out, the risk of a pending
restriction may be reflected in the cost of property for some time before the formal adoption
of a zoning change. See Serkin, supra note 215, at 697-99.
255. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
256. JAEGER & PLANTINGA, supra note 13, at 22.
257. Oppenheimer, supra note 14.
258. ECHEVERRIA & HANSEN-YOUNG, supra note 72, at 53.

259. Oppenheimer, supra note 14.
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really require that society pay her for restrictions that prevented her from
realizing an even greater profit on her land?
D. Conclusion
As they did for the concept of property rights, the debates generated
under Measure 37 and 49 highlighted the difficulty with demanding
compensation as a matter of fairness. In contrast with permanent physical
takings, in which the claimant loses the land altogether, governmental
action impacts land value in multiple ways. A simple "with and without"
calculation of the impact of any land use restriction-the standard measure
for calculating loss alleged in takings cases and by Measure 37 claimantsmay unfairly allow the claimant to demand societal compensation even if
the same action has actually increased the value of the property. While less
subject to abuse, the chronologically specific "before and after" assessment
tool adopted under Measure 49 treats change in property value as reflecting
effects of a single regulation and raises broader questions about whether
fairness truly requires compensation for owners willing to violate dominant
uses of land in an area. In addition, the evidence regarding tremendous
returns on owner investments with the restrictions in place leads to
questions of whether such owners are truly deserving of compensation as a
matter of justice. In the same way that claims for compensation based on
rights and efficiency arguments faltered under the Measure 37 regime,
fairness demands regarding the allocation of loss proved less convincing as
well.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE OREGON EXPERIMENT

Advocates of greater compensation for regulatory restrictions on property
use often assert some mix of three different claims. First, restrictions on the
use of property take property rights and so demand a remedy; second,
requiring compensation makes governments internalize the costs of their
actions and therefore promotes efficient regulation; and third, restrictions
undermine the value of property in ways that it is unfair to make the owner
bear alone. The experience under Measure 37 challenges each of these
assumptions in important and related ways. First, with respect to property
rights, the Oregon experiment underscored the degree to which property
rights, as understood by the public, depend on governmental regulation as
much as they are restricted by them. Next, with respect to the costinternalization argument, Measure 37 provided powerful evidence that
compensation requirements deter governmental regulation, but seriously
called into question the corollary that more efficient regulation will be the
result. Finally, with respect to the just-compensation argument, Measure 37
raised even more questions regarding what compensation justice truly
requires. This Part uses each of these facets of the Oregon experiment to
reflect on broader debates about compensation for regulatory restrictions.
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A. PropertyRights
The most powerful popular argument for increased compensation for
260
regulatory restrictions is that they deprive owners of property rights.
Although the argument that use restrictions are included within the
protection of the Takings Clause finds little support in the original
understanding of the clause, 26 1 the Court has repeatedly recognized the
right to use as one of the sticks in the bundle of rights that together
comprise "property." 262 More important, this notion of property rights
initially deeply resonated with owners and voters. If "property," as one of
the less famous Founders famously declared, "is the guardian of every other
right, '263 deprivation of property rights strikes hard at the individual sense
of the democratic compact. And as the Oregon legislature saw in the
debates over Measure 49, there is something about property rights that stirs
public opinion and passion as few other things can.
These same debates, however, highlighted the extent to which there are
real, felt rights on both sides. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
legislatures are empowered to restrict use to resolve conflicts between
property rights without compensation. 264 Although this power is not

260. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 35, at 10-12, 57 (using Lockean conception

of natural rights of individual against sovereign to argue that any governmental
diminishment of the rights of the owner that would not be permitted a private individual at
common law is within the scope of the Takings Clause); Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Leslie
Marshall Lewallen & Timothy Sandefur, Measure 37: Paying Peoplefor What We Take, 36
ENVTL. L. 79, 82 (2006) ("Property is part of a familiar triad-along with life and libertythat has as its essence the right to self-actualization. The reason that a traditional
condemnation requires compensation is that it unfairly deprives a person, without her
consent, of the fight to use her faculties as she sees fit. Regulatory takings are no
different.").
261. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 783 (1995).
262. Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) ("Of the aggregate rights associated
with any property interest, the right of use of property is perhaps of the highest order.");
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433, 435 (1982) (describing
property rights in a physical thing as "the rights 'to possess, use, and dispose of it"' (quoting
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))); see also United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) ("A common idiom describes property as a 'bundle of
sticks'-a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute
property." (citation omitted)).
263. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1992) (quoting constitutional convention delegate Arthur

Lee of Virginia) (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("The transition
from our early focus on control of noxious uses to our contemporary understanding of the
broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation was an easy one,
since the distinction between harm-preventing and benefit-conferring regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 279 (1928) ("[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed in
dangerous proximity.... When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.").
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limited to prohibitions of nuisances, 2 65 some have suggested that legislative
prohibitions that do not replicate nuisance law or other common-law
prohibitions on title demand compensation. 2 66 The Measure 49 debates
showed that owners' commonsense understanding of their rights in property
went much further than this. It included far more than a narrowly Lockean
freedom of action plus a few background common-law principles
preventing unreasonable harms. Rather, it was the product of the complex
web of neighbor, community, and governmental action as well. Oregonians
insisted on their rights to maintain those restrictions and prevent their
neighbors from using their property to transform their communities, even
when the planned uses were far from nuisances or activities with an impact
on public health and
safety. This effect provides support to claims that a
"social relations" 267 or "propriety"2 68 understanding of property plays an
important part of the public consciousness and legal tradition.
Importantly, however, this understanding was not initially part of most
owners' intuitive sense of property rights. Rather than a conflict between
property rights, the 2004 vote on Measure 37 was seen largely as a contest
between property rights and environmental and administrative interests,
with predictable results. It took the absence of the background rules of
social coordination for owners to see that these too comprised part of their
property. Once those stories were known, however, they powerfully
motivated voters, deciding not only Oregon's 2007 election, but also the
2006 elections in Washington, California, and Idaho. 269 In invoking the

265. Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 ("We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the
infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be
so declared by statute."); see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593
(1962) (stating in case upholding challenge to ordinance prohibiting future mining at a
quarry that it was not of controlling significance "that the use prohibited is arguably not a
common-law nuisance"); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (holding
in case rejecting challenge to ordinance barring operation of existing livery stable that "the
argument that a livery stable is not a nuisance per se... is beside the question" and the only
limitation on the municipal power was that the "power [could not be] exerted arbitrarily, or
with unjust discrimination").
266. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 35, at 36 ("On Lockean principles the
government stands no better than the citizens it represents on whether property has been
taken, so a simple test determines, not the ultimate liability of the government, but whether
its actions are brought within the purview of the eminent domain clause."); see also Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that historic preservation ordinance preventing building above a certain height
wrought a taking because the ordinance did not prohibit a nuisance); cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029 (holding that where a restriction wipes out all economic benefit of land the limitation
demands compensation unless it inheres in the title of the land via nuisance or other common
law principles).
267. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 653
(1988).
268. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997); Carol M. Rose,
Propertyas Wealth, Property as Propriety,in NoMos XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223,
223-41 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
269. See supranotes 114-36 and accompanying text.
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"expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property,' ' 270 therefore, both
legislatures and courts should recall that they include a reliance on
government action to preserve community conditions, but that this
expectation will rarely-unless the threat to those regulations becomes
concrete-become conscious. Further they should recognize that if (as the
subsequent section will discuss) compensation requirements significantly
reduce the likelihood of governmental restrictions, in effect the
compensation requirement will result in deprivation of the property rights
of some to vindicate the rights of others.
B. Efficiency
If populist arguments focus on rights, economic arguments focus on the
efficiency effects of requiring compensation for regulatory restrictions. The
experience under Measure 37 provided support for those who argue that
requiring compensation will not necessarily increase regulatory efficiency.
While the unique nature of the Oregon experiment-the flood of
compensation requests for already enacted regulations-limits the general
applicability of its results, these results correspond to both theories about
governmental behavior and the experience of jurisdictions with solely
prospective compensation requirements. 27 1 Compensation requirements
clearly did deter land use restrictions, but without any calculation of the
social good those restrictions produced. If compensation simply deters
without improving, the relevant question shifts to whether the legal system
should systematically deter all land use regulation, or whether there are
particular actions that are especially suspect and whether this subset can be
addressed through more narrowly tailored measures.
Some, of course, would argue that governmental regulation in general is
inefficient interference with market processes, so that anything that reduces
such regulation is desirable. Compensating property owners directly,
however, is only a blunt and inefficient tool to achieve this end. 272 In
Oregon, for example, compensation requirements (not surprisingly) resulted
in an abundance of expensive red tape. Firm opponents of regulation may
desire more direct and less expensive means of achieving their ends, such as
supermajority requirements for land use legislation or governmentmandated studies of their costs and benefits. Still, the effectiveness of the
compensation requirement of undoing regulatory restriction in Oregon (at
least until voter revolt) may be appealing to this group.
All but the most committed free-marketeers, however, recognize the
necessity of some regulation and seek instead simply to achieve better
270. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
271. ECHEVERRIA & HANSEN-YOUNG, supra note 72, at 8-9, 17-21 (providing examples
of the chilling effect that Florida and Arizona prospective compensation laws have had on
passage and implementation of land use restrictions).
272. Cf Heller & Krier, supra note 35, at 1006-09 (suggesting that in some cases a
general distribution rather than specific distribution to the harmed individuals may be the
best way to achieve deterrence).
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regulations. If a general compensation requirement will not have this
salutary effect, concerned policy makers might more profitably turn to
reforms designed to address specific weaknesses in land use regulation. Is
the concern really about governmental imposition on discrete insular
minorities? 273 Policy makers might then wish to protect and enhance the
ability to bring disparate impact challenges to zoning decisions. 2 74 Is the
concern about domination of the political process by well-connected
individuals? Policy makers might act to improve the procedural fairness
and transparency of decisionmaking processes, or apply heightened scrutiny
to decisions whose circumstances suggest particular concerns along these
lines. 275 Or is the concern that NIMBY-ism will lead municipalities to
enact low-density requirements that exclude the poor and encourage
sprawl? States might then modify their zoning enabling acts to address
these issues directly, by requiring municipalities to include a certain amount
of high-density zoning within their borders or, as Oregon does, by largely
confining housing to Urban Growth Districts. One might even try to take
advantage of the quasi-market processes of pollution cap-and-trade systems,
by allowing communities to pay to purchase exemptions from higher
2 76
density requirements from other municipalities.
None of these proposals will be attractive to those whose primary
concern is making zoning decisions more like the cost-benefit calculus of
market decisions. The problem is that general compensation requirements
do not have this effect either. Indeed, to the extent that some regulations do
go forward, they will likely, as Measure 37 did, add layers of inefficiency to
an already imperfect process. If the Measure 37 effect is generalizable
outside its circumstances, it suggests that those concerned with land use
regulations should focus directly on the sources of their concern, rather than
on the unwieldy and ineffective remedy of widespread compensation.
273. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-23 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
274. Compare City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188
(2003) (holding defendant city was entitled to summary judgment on claim that by first
enacting ordinance permitting building of low income housing complex, then revoking
ordinance after voter-led initiative, city violated Fourteenth Amendment), with Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)
(holding that zoning plan limiting multiunit housing to largely minority neighborhoods had
disparate impact in violation of the Fair Housing Act), and Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109
F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that low-density zoning plan had illegal disparate
impact against minorities and was motivated by discriminatory intent).
275. Justice Kennedy has suggested more stringent review along these lines for improper
influence in eminent domain for economic development. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 173, at 72 (arguing that public choice
theory suggests there should be a "safe harbor" for governments against takings challenges
where the action burdens a powerful and well-defined group to provide a diffuse societal
benefit).
276. Such a solution may well, of course, fail to address the concentration of low-income
voters in particular municipalities but would both make communities bear the costs of their
exclusionary decisions and provide an effective substitute for property taxes for higher
density locales.
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C. Fairness
If rights and efficiency do not resolve the regulatory takings muddle, we
are left with perhaps the thorniest problem of all-when fairness demands a
public remedy for individual losses. The experience under Measure 37
spoke to this problem only indirectly, by questioning how to fairly calculate
loss. Evaluating loss is complex even for physical takings, and answers to
the question often entail resolution of the broader questions inherent in
takings law itself.277 Determining whether and what compensation is
demanded for regulatory restrictions is even more challenging, as it is far
less clear what protection owners are entitled to demand against regulatory
change. This section does not seek to resolve these questions, but simply
shows the ways debates over compensation under Measure 37 underscored
the old concepts of "reciprocity of advantage" 278 and legitimate
"investment-backed expectations" 279 in evaluating land use restrictions.
In legislating that compensation was required for zoning laws, Measure
37 and laws like it went beyond what even the most procompensation
scholars and jurists have argued that justice demands. 2 80 It is generally
accepted that land use restrictions enforced across neighborhoods ensure an
average reciprocity of advantage that undermines claims to compensation
against the state. 28 1 Research catalyzed by Measure 37 emphasized why
this is so: general regulations produce both amenity and scarcity effects
that substantially mitigate any claims of injustice. While it will often be
difficult, if not impossible, to fully calculate the net effect of all
governmental actions on a single parcel, this very complexity suggests that
such regulations "simply 'adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic
282
life' rather than cause a compensable taking.
But the Measure 37 experiment evaluation of compensable losses raised
questions that challenge not only state legislative measures but debates in
the Supreme Court as well, by exposing the difficulties of fairness demands
that do not incorporate the reasonable return on the owner's investment in
the property. The most visible Measure 37 claimants had used their
property for the purpose for which they had purchased it for many years,
and its value had increased to many times their initial investment. Does
justice demand public recompense if subsequently enacted regulations

277. Serkin, supra note 215, at 742; see also Michelman, supra note 35, at 1167.
278. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
279. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130, 136 (1978).

280. See, e.g., id. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between landmark
law and zoning laws whose burdens were justified by an average reciprocity of advantage);
EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 35, at 99-100 (distinguishing between regulations
that impose disproportionate burdens on a few and so demand compensation and those that
impose reciprocal burdens and benefits and presumptively do not require compensation).
281. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 140.
282. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (quoting Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124); see, e.g., Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law."); EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 35, at 99-100.
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prevent them from realizing more profit still? Or does the fact that the most
valuable use of the land has shifted to one that was not sufficiently
profitable at the time of purchase, but is not legal at the time of desired
development, violate the implicit bargains property owners make with the
state? Outside Oregon, these questions frequently arise with respect to
wetlands litigation, which often involves owners who have purchased large
tracts of land, sold or developed upland portions of it, and now seek
compensation because the law prohibits them from developing the
remainder that has only now become profitable to fill. 2 83 In such cases it
seems that the problem of postacquisition regulation arises precisely
because the state is sensibly acting to prevent an increasingly problematic
land use that would not have been economically feasible for the owner to
exploit before.
Seen this way, the regulatory change looks far less like an unjust burden
than the expected action of the government in managing changing demands
on the land. This is not to say that governments cannot seek to ameliorate
the impact of their actions on owners. Indeed, some financial recognition
may be necessary to secure the passage of restrictive legislation. In Oregon,
the State gave up substantial tax revenue for lands in exclusive farm or
timber use. 284 In New York, the City provided landmarked buildings with
the ability to sell their development rights to properties that wished to build
above general height limitations. 285 In Rhode Island, Palazzolo could have
made an open-space gift of his wetlands property to generate as much as
$157,500 in federal tax deductions. 2 86 But these benefits need not directly
match some ill-defined measure of loss caused by the regulations, nor is
there a clear argument that basic fairness demands it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Takings law is a famously irresolvable puzzle. It involves "fundamental
questions of political life, ' '287 invoking directly the relationships between
the individual, the community, and the state, between the home and the
marketplace. It would be hard for one short-lived popular initiative to solve
the continuing conundrum of when and what governments must pay owners
in regulating their land. But the Oregon experiment, limited as it was,
283. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that denial of permit to fill fifty acres of wetlands and lake bed from original 311acre parcel was a taking unless subject to a navigational servitude); Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that federal government took
property by denying right to fill last 11.5 acres of 250-acre development); Palazzolo v. State,
746 A.2d 707, 709-10 (R.I. 2000), rev'd, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (describing original purchase
of larger tract in 1959 and sale of many of its upland parcels by 1961).
284. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308A.50-.128 (2007) (farmland taxation); OR. REV. STAT.

321.257-.287 (2007) (forestland taxation).
285. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122.
286. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 715.

287. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1396
(1991).
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provided on-the-ground evidence to help future legislators, courts, and
scholars move beyond abstract theory and see a radically different approach
to regulatory restrictions in practice.
By turning the constitutional approach to regulatory takings on its head
and requiring compensation for all losses due to postacquisition regulation,
the Oregon experiment allows us to look at property through a new lens.
Through this lens, classic arguments regarding rights, efficiency, and
fairness were upended as well. It was government action-not freedom
from it-that protected owners' rights to their castles; compensation
requirements did not lead to efficient land use regulation but simply shut it
down; and even claims to unjust losses seemed hollow, attempts to hold
communities hostage to reap unexpected windfalls from their investments.
The lessons to be drawn from this new perspective appear little different
from the current jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, which seems to
acknowledge that governmental regulation is incorporated in an owner's
expectancies with regard to property and that compensation requirements
will often prevent beneficial governmental action. 28 8 Even the Court's
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council2 89 decision, bemoaned as creating
a categorical rule for certain regulatory takings, has arguably catalyzed
greater attention to the background principles that limit all owners'
justifiable expectations in their property. 290 There is nevertheless no
consensus, either on the Court or in the public arena. The Supreme Court's
decisions rejecting regulatory takings claims are marked by sharp
dissents, 29 1 and popular revolts against laws perceived as unjust have had
292
even more success in state legislatures.
The lessons of the Oregon experiment speak to those who sympathize
with these movements, recognizing the validity of governmental regulation,
but concerned about the rights of those subject to its burdens. These
lessons make clearer that the choice is often not between regulation with
compensation and regulation without but, rather, between regulation and no
288. See, e.g., id. at 1396-97 (describing longstanding judicial consensus that supports
"broad governmental authority to adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life" and
"commitment to ad hoc factual inquiry"); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society
and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L.

REv. 309, 327-28 (2006) (describing the years since Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council as ones in which "the heart of regulatory takings law seems to have been taken over
by the investment or 'justified expectations' model").
289. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
290. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 322

(2005) (arguing that Lucas has undermined nonwipeout regulatory takings claims by
establishing that background principles of property law may undermine the owner's
expectations of use).
291. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 343 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that moratorium on construction
while considering lake preservation plan constituted taking); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 139
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that historic preservation ordinance preventing
substantial use of air rights of building constituted taking).
292. Jacobs, supra note 36, at 2.
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regulation. They suggest that losses claimed are often not part of what an
owner can justifiably assert as her rights. Most important, they indicate
why this is so: property rights depend on the actions of one's neighbors,
one's community, and one's government in seeking (however imperfectly)
to protect them.

